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Abstract
This paper discusses allocation of burden of proof in environmental disputes in the
WTO system. Besides laying down the natural principles that (i) the complainant
carries the burden to (ii) make a prima facie case that its claim holds, WTO adjudicating
bodies have said little of more general nature. The paper therefore examines the case
law of relevance to environmental policies, to establish the rules concerning burden of
proof that are likely to be applied in such disputes. Evaluating this case law, the paper
makes two observations,: First, in cases submitted under the GATTWTO, adjudicating
bodies have committed errors regarding the required amount of evidence (the burden
of persuasion); and second, such errors, as well as errors concerning the determination
of the party to carry the burden of providing this evidence (the burden of production),
have been committed in disputes submitted under the TBT/SPS Agreements. These
errors largely seem attributable to the general absence of methodology regarding the
interpretation of some key substantive provisions featuring in the three Agreements.

JEL Classification: Q56, F13
Key Words: Burden of Proof, Burden of Production, Burden of Persuasion, WTO,
Environment
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1 Introduction
This paper seeks to shed light on the allocation of burden of proof in environmental
disputes that are submitted for adjudication to the World Trade Organization (WTO).
1

The most important constraints on WTO Members when regulating to protect

environment are the non‐discrimination provisions in various agreements coming
under the aegis of the WTO, namely, the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade), TBT (Technical Barriers to Trade), SPS (Sanitary and Phyto‐sanitary
Measures). 2 The allocation of the burden of proof in disputes concerning these
provisions, as in the WTO in general, was not decided at the legislative level; it is the
WTO judge that has decided it.3 This allocation can have an important bearing on the
eventual outcome of disputes, which often will be influenced by factors such as who
carries the burden to produce evidence (burden of production), and how much proof is
necessary to shift the burden of production to the other party (burden of persuasion).

In this paper we will argue that case‐law has been problematic with respect to the
allocation of the burden of proof. We will try to demonstrate that GATT‐panels have
made errors when it comes to deciding on the burden of persuasion, whereas TBT‐
and SPS‐panels have inappropriately allocated the burden of production, as well as
the burden of persuasion. To make this point we will review all GATT/WTO disputes
where the consistency of a domestic instrument with the WTO rules has been

There is paucity in the literature regarding comprehensive analysis of WTO practice in this respect.
Grando (2009) is highly exceptional in this context.
2 An environmental dispute can also occur in the GATS‐context. We have yet to see one submitted to
the WTO. In this paper however, we limit our research in the field of trade in goods, which comprises
the totality of environmental disputes so far.
3 Mavroidis (2008) sides with the view that the WTO judge has implied powers to do so stemming from
Art. 11 DSU (the obligation to perform an objective assessment of the matter before it).
1
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challenged, since all domestic instruments – environmental regulation included –must
at least potentially obey the same legal discipline.4

The rest of the paper is divided as follows: in Section 2 we will briefly discuss the
objectives of the WTO dispute settlement (DS): the allocation of the burden of proof is
a means towards an ends, and an understanding of the ends, that is, the objectives of
the WTO dispute settlement system, is required to discuss the means. Section 3
examines the GATT‐cases, and Section 4 the TBT‐ and SPS‐cases. Section 5 concludes.

2 The Allocation of Burden of Proof in Light of the
Objectives of WTO DS
The WTO agreement is a self‐enforcing contract: there is no room for ex officio
complaints,

WTO

Members

being

the

only

entities

that

can

act

as

complainants/defendants; a natural consequence of this feature is that WTO Members
are the ‘masters’ of the disputes, and WTO adjudicating bodies can only rule on
claims as presented to them. This is the non ultra petita maxim, according to which
courts can only rule on claims presented to them by the parties to a dispute: in its
report on Mexico – Corn Syrup (Article 21.5 – US) the Appellate Body (AB)
incorporated this maxim in the WTO legal order (§ 36):

… as a matter of due process, and the proper exercise of the judicial function, panels
are required to address issues that are put before them by the parties to a dispute.

There are of course differences between Arts. III and XX GATT, as well as between GATT on the one
hand and TBT and SPS on the other. Irrespective however, whether a dispute concerns public health,
environment, or another domestic instrument, it will be submitted to the same legal discipline under
the GATT, or the TBT (if applicable), or the SPS (if applicable).
4
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By the same token, the AB in its report on US – Certain EC Products reversed panel’s
findings on issues which had not been put properly before it: in the case, the
complainant had not presented any claims under Art. 23.2(a) of the Understanding on
Dispute Settlement (DSU),5 and this omission notwithstanding, the panel pronounced
on the consistency of the actions of the respondent with the mentioned legal basis.
The AB argued that a panel cannot make claims for either party. The AB subsequently
[EC – Hormones (US)] explained that panels should be free to develop their own
reasoning, independently of the arguments advanced by the parties but within the
ambit of the claims submitted to them (§ 156):

… Panels are inhibited from addressing legal claims falling outside their terms of
reference. However, nothing in the DSU limits the faculty of a panel freely to use
arguments submitted by any of the parties – or to develop its own legal reasoning – to
support its own findings and conclusions on the matter under its consideration. A panel
might well be unable to carry out an objective assessment of the matter, as mandated by
Article 11 of the DSU, if in its reasoning it had to restrict itself solely to arguments
presented by the parties to the dispute. Given that in this particular case both
complainants claimed that the EC measures were inconsistent with Article 5.5 of the SPS
Agreement, we conclude that the Panel did not make any legal finding beyond those
requested by the parties. [italics in the original].

Consequently, the non ultra petita maxim covers claims only, and not arguments in
support of claims.

WTO adjudicating bodies have, on the other hand, important investigating authority
(Art. 13 DSU): they are free to ask any questions they deem appropriate to the parties

This provision bans any unilateral qualification that an illegality has occurred. Such pronouncements
are the exclusive privilege of WTO adjudicating bodies.
5
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to the dispute, and can further have recourse to outside expertise in an effort to
illuminate their understanding of the dispute.6

In a nutshell, panels have substantial investigating powers that they can use in order
to decide on the validity of the claims presented to them by the parties to a dispute.
The purpose of the WTO dispute settlement system is not the ‘discovery of the truth’,
but the response to the question ‘is the complainant’s claim valid under the applicable
laws’? It is in this context, that we will be discussing the allocation of burden of proof.

3 The BoP in GATT Disputes
We begin by examining the BoP in GATT disputes.

3.1 The Law
Any domestic instrument, including those protecting the environment, must respect
the discipline of National Treatment (NT) embodied in Art. III GATT, which
essentially calls for non‐discriminatory application of all measures adopted at the
national level. 7 Art. III GATT distinguishes between discrimination through fiscal

The term investigating authority is often referred to as discovery powers in WTO parlance, see
Palmeter and Mavroidis (2004).
7 A WTO Member might choose to use a trade instrument instead, and impose an import quota on all
imports aiming at protecting its market from environmental damage, without imposing a similar
requirement on domestic products. According to standard case‐law, such measures will violate Art. XI
GATT, and the discussion will soon to move to Art. XX GATT, since all the complainant will have to
show is that a quota is in place. The regulator will then be asked to demonstrate, inter alia, that its
measures are non‐discriminatory, otherwise it cannot satisfy the requirements of the chapeau of Art.
XX GATT. So, no matter which road has been chosen (domestic, or trade instrument), what matters at
the end of the day is that the environmental measure is non‐discriminatory. Note also the Interpretative
Note ad Art. III GATT which makes it clear that a domestic measure enforced at the border should still
be regarded as a domestic measure coming under the disciplines of Art. III GATT. In this vein, a sales
ban on environment unfriendly material can legitimately be enforced at the border, and stop imports of
6
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measures (e.g., an environmental tax), and non‐fiscal measures (e.g., a sales ban on
environment‐unfriendly (EUF) products).

The disciplines on fiscal measures are included in Art. III.2 GATT, which
distinguishes between like‐, and directly competitive or substitutable products (DCS).8 Art
III.2 GATT, first sentence, includes the obligations that WTO Members incur when
they apply fiscal measures on like products:

The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any
other contracting party shall not be subject, directly or indirectly, to internal taxes or other
internal charges of any kind in excess of those applied, directly or indirectly, to like
domestic products.

Art. III.2 GATT, second sentence, does the same with respect to DCS products:

Moreover, no contracting party shall otherwise apply internal taxes or other internal
charges to imported or domestic products in a manner contrary to the principles set forth
in paragraph 1.

Art. III.1 GATT, to which it refers, reads:

The Members recognize that internal taxes and other internal charges, and laws,
regulations and requirements affecting the internal sale, offering for sale, purchase,
transportation, distribution or use of products, and internal quantitative regulations
requiring the mixture, processing or use of products in specified amounts or proportions,

similar goods; its consistency with the GATT will depend on whether the sales ban at hand observes
the discipline included in Art. III GATT. An Interpretative Note is part of the treaty (GATT), that is, it
reflects a contractual obligation that WTO Members have agreed to respect.
8 We are, of course, always looking for a pair of two like‐, or DCS products, one domestic, and one
foreign.

8

should not be applied to imported or domestic products so as to afford protection to
domestic production.

Finally, Art III.2 GATT, second sentence, has an Interpretative Note that reads:

A tax conforming to the requirements of the first sentence of paragraph 2 would be
considered to be inconsistent with the provisions of the second sentence only in cases
where competition was involved between, on the one hand, the taxed product and, on the
other hand, a directly competitive or substitutable product which was not similarly taxed.

A complainant, who is challenging the consistency of an environmental measure with
Art. III.2 GATT, can, in principle, choose between two routes. One is to argue that:

(i)

the domestic and the foreign products are like; and

(ii)

the latter is taxed in excess of the former.

The other is to claim that:

(iii)

the two products are directly competitive or substitutable (DCS);

(iv)

the two products are not similarly taxed; and

(v)

the dissimilar taxation operates so as to afford protection to domestic
production (SATAP).9

Central to the scope of the NT provision is thus the adjudicating bodiesʹ interpretation
of the italicized terms in (i)‐(v).
It could be argued that a textual reading of the Interpretative Note ad Article III suggests that points (iv)
and (v) are one and the same. The Appellate Body (AB) has distinguished between the two elements in
the sense that, in its view, dissimilar taxation is a necessary but not sufficient condition for protection to
have been afforded (Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II).
9

9

Art. III.4 GATT, which deals with discrimination through non‐fiscal measures,
reproduces essentially the same idea, applying however, in modified terminology.

The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any
other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that
accorded to like products of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and
requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation,
distribution or use….

The complainant would thus have to argue that the imported product is subjected to
less favourable treatment than that applicable to domestic like products: the
interpretation of the italicized terms holds the key to the discipline imposed through
this provision.10

Assuming that a violation of Art. III GATT has been demonstrated, the regulating
WTO Member can still exonerate itself from liability, if it can successfully invoke one
of the justifying grounds included in Art. XX GATT. This provision is entitled “General
Exceptions”, and has been acknowledged by the AB as an exception to measures
coming the purview of both Art. III, and Art. XI GATT.11 Art. XX GATT contains an
exhaustive list of grounds justifying deviations from all GATT provisions. The
following parts of Art. XX have been acknowledged in GATT/WTO case‐law as
relevant for justifying measures aimed at protecting the environment:

Environmental measures can also come under Art. II GATT, although it will have to be at the 8 digit
level of tariff classifications since, typically, classifications up to the 6 level do not make room for
environmental concerns: a WTO Member might thus, provide favourable customs treatment to asbestos
free‐, while penalizing asbestos containing‐construction material. No dispute has been submitted in this
context so far and, as a result, any discussion regarding the allocation of burden of proof in similar
cases would be highly speculative.
11 For an example of the former, see the AB report on Korea – Various Measures on Beef; for an example of
the latter, see the AB report on US – Shrimp.
10
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Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries
where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in
this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any
contracting party of measures:

(b)

necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health;

(g)

relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such
measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on
domestic production or consumption.

Once again, the italicized terms hold the key to understanding how an otherwise
GATT‐inconsistent measure can be justified because it is meant to protect
environment.

3.2 Burden of Production in the GATT
In public international law (PIL) in general, the maxim actori incumbit probatio requests
from the party making a claim to verify its truthfulness. This maxim was introduced
into the WTO legal order by the AB in its report on US ‐ Wool Shirts and Blouses. It has
been cited in practically all disputes ever since (§ 14):

It is a generally accepted canon of evidence in civil law, common law, and, in fact,
most jurisdictions, that the burden of proof rests upon the party, whether complaining
or defending, who asserts the affirmative of a particular claim or defence. If that party
adduces sufficient evidence to raise a presumption that what is claimed is true, the
burden then shifts to the other party, who will fail unless it adduces sufficient evidence
to rebut the presumption.

11

If the law distinguishes between a rule and an exception, then legal orders usually
follow the PIL maxim quicunque exceptio invokat ejudem probare debet: the party
invoking the exception carries the burden of proof to demonstrate compliance with
the conditions reflected in the exception. The India – Autos dispute serves as an
illustration of a case where this maxim has been applied. In this case, India invoked
Art. XVIII GATT to justify on balance‐of‐payments (BOP) grounds a quantitative
restriction. India was responding to a claim by the US that its measures were in
violation of Art. XI GATT, a claim which in the eyes of the panel, the US had proved.
Seeing Art. XVIII GATT as an exception to Art. XI GATT, the panel put the burden of
justifying the violation of Art. XI GATT on India (§§ 7.285 – 7.292).

It follows that the party claiming that a violation of Arts. III or XI GATT has occurred
carries the burden to demonstrate that this has indeed been the case. Since Art. XX
GATT is an exception to the obligations assumed under the GATT, it is the defendant
who will carry the proof, assuming, of course, that the complainant has absolved its
own when claiming that a GATT provision (Arts. III, XI) has been violated as a result
of a measure adopted by the defendant.12 The AB, citing prior case law to this effect
(US – Gasoline, pp. 22‐23; US – Wool Shirts and Blouses, pp. 15‐16; US – FSC (Article 21.5
– EC), § 133) has confirmed this view in its report on US – Gambling (§ 309):

It is well‐established that a responding party invoking an affirmative defence bears the
burden of demonstrating that its measure, found to be WTO‐inconsistent, satisfies the
requirements of the invoked defence.

As we will see in more detail infra, the burden of production shifts back and forth between
complainant and defendant in the context of Art. XX GATT, when recourse to Art. XX(b) GATT has
been made, depending on whether the burden of persuasion has been respected.

12
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3.3 Burden of Persuasion in the GATT

3.3.1 Making a Prima Facie Case
Recall that, by virtue of the AB report on US ‐ Wool Shirts and Blouses, the complainant
needs to establish a prima facie case that its claim holds.13 Case‐law has not specified
what constitutes prima facie evidence but, in general, some sort of reasonableness‐
standard seems to emerge. Assuming a prima facie case has been made, the burden of
production will shift to the other party: the panel report on Thailand – H‐Beams for
example, requests (§7.49) from Thailand to provide effective refutation against Poland’s
prima facie case. However, this depiction of dispute adjudication as a game of tennis
where the ball has to fly above the net for the other party to respond is misleading:
adjudicating bodies will look at the totality of the evidence each side has presented.
As the AB noted in its report on Korea – Dairy, there is:

no provision in the DSU … that requires a panel to make an explicit ruling on whether
the complainant has established a prima facie case of violation before a panel may
proceed to examine the respondent’s defence and evidence…[§ 145 italics in the
original].

Making a prima facie case is shorthand for observing a particular burden of
persuasion. 14 A prima facie case is not automatically made when the respondent
remains silent: the panel on Mexico – Taxes on Soft Drinks ruled that the duty of the
complainant to make a prima facie case is not affected by the defendant’s decision not
to challenge the claims and arguments made. Mexico had chosen not to raise any
defence in some of the claims advanced by the US. The panel implicitly held that

Panels have used the term “to make a prima facie case” as equivalent to the obligation to “raise a
presumption” that what is claimed is true (US – Stainless Steel at § 6.2).
14 See on this issue, the excellent analysis in Sanchirico (1997).
13
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Mexico’s inaction did not amount to admission that the US had made a prima facie case
(§§ 8.16ff.). The panel went on and examined to what extent, in its view, and in
absence of a Mexican response, such was indeed the case. Similarly, the fact that the
defendant has attempted to rebut a claim presented by the complainant does not
necessarily mean that, in the panel’s view, the complainant has established a
presumption (see, for example, India – Autos §§ 7.231 – 7.233).

Finally, the panel in the US – 1916 Act (EC) dispute concluded that evidence
submitted by the complainant and the defendant was in equipoise. It then held that, in
such cases, the advantage rests with the party responding to the claim (§ 6.58):

If, after having applied the above methodology, we could not reach certainty as to the
most appropriate court interpretation, i.e. if the evidence remains in equipoise, we
shall follow the interpretation that favours the party against which the claim has been
made, considering that the claimant did not convincingly support its claim.

So, we know what the standard is (prima facie), but the question what exactly it
amounts to still remains unanswered. The only way to respond to this question is to
look at the case‐law. Before however, we move to do that, it is warranted to visit the
other ‘horizontal’ elements in case‐law which circumscribe the burden of persuasion:
the relevance of trade effects and regulatory intent.

3.3.2 No Trade Effects Required, Sometimes Intent Required
WTO adjudicating bodies have consistently held in NT cases that no adverse trade
effects

15

(resulting from the measure challenged) need to be shown for the

establishment of a violation of Art. III (or Art. XI) GATT. On the other hand, the AB
has stated that sometimes WTO adjudicating bodies will need to look into factors
15

This standard has actually been inherited from the GATT Superfund‐jurisprudence.

14

(design, architecture of the measure) which reveal the protective application of the
measure. This will be necessary in case of differential taxation (between domestic and
foreign DCS product) where the amount of difference is more than de minimis but less
than substantial.16 We are in the dark as to whether regulatory intent is relevant in
cases a non‐fiscal domestic instrument has been used17 and, so far, it seems to be the
case that there is no need to inquire into regulatory intent whenever recourse to an
import quota has been made.18

With this in mind, we can now turn to examine how the key terms in Art. III GATT
have been interpreted in case‐law, and respond thus to the question what is the
burden of persuasion associated with claims under Art. III GATT.

3.3.3 The Key Terms in Art. III GATT
3.3.3.1 DCS
In its report on Japan—Alcoholic Beverages II, the AB provided its understanding of the
term. The dispute arose because of a Japanese alcohol taxation scheme which, while
on its face origin neutral, resulted in predominantly western‐produced drinks (such as
whisky and vodka) to be heavier taxed than drinks predominantly produced in Japan
(sochu). The EC and the US protested, arguing that the products at hand were at least
DCS, if not like products. The panel had already accepted that all of the products
concerned (with the exception of vodka, which was deemed to be like product to
sochu) were DCS products because they shared:
The two italicized terms were not discussed any further in the only case where they were invoked: in
Chile – Alcoholic Beverages, the panel held (and the AB upheld) that a 20% tax differential was substantial.
17 The term less favourable treatment has been understood to be the equivalent to the term so as to afford
protection appearing in Art. III.1 GATT. So far however, this term has not been interpreted in
meaningful manner.
18 By virtue of the GATT panel report US – Superfund.
16

15

(a) physical characteristics;
(b) common end‐uses; and
(c) tariff classification

The AB upheld the panel’s view. Importantly, by upholding the panel’s findings in
this respect, the AB made it clear that the test to define whether two products are DCS
is in the marketplace, in the sense that, it is consumer behaviour that ultimately
determines whether two products are in competition with each other. To determine
whether two products are indeed in competition with each other, econometric evidence
could be used (in this case, cross‐price elasticity).19 . The EC had submitted some
consumer surveys to this effect, suggesting that Japanese consumers in the absence of
discriminatory taxation would be prepared to substitute sochu for a host of Western
drinks (p 25).

In Korea—Alcoholic Beverages, the facts were very similar to those in Japan—Alcoholic
Beverages II: beverages predominantly produced in Korea (soju) were hit by a
substantially lower tax burden than their counterparts which were predominantly
produced in the EC, Canada, and the US (vodka, whisky, etc). The EC, Canada, and
the US complained, arguing that the Korean regime was GATT‐inconsistent. But
Korea argued that its system could not be held to be discriminatory since the products

Through the use of cross price elasticity, we capture an important aspect of the substitution among
products in response to price changes: what is the change in the demanded quantity for product X, in
case of a price change in product Y (formally, it is derived by dividing the percentage change in
quantity of good X by the percentage change in price for good Y). If the ratio is negative, the products
concerned are sometimes said to be complements; if positive, substitutes. The degree of elasticity can
vary: the higher the number (above 1), the more the two products are substitutes. Neither the panel nor
the AB discussed the required levels for products to be in a DCS relationship.
19
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concerned were not DCS in the first place: the price of (diluted) soju20 was a small
fraction of the price of the Western drinks at hand. Consequently, following the
analysis in Japan—Alcoholic Beverages, and the relevance of econometric indicators in
deciding whether two products are DCS, Korea argued that with respect to (diluted)
soju at least, no claim under Art. III.2 GATT could be sustained since, in presence of
the important price differential across soju and the western drinks involved, it was
unlikely that Korean consumers would substitute the latter for the former. The
complaining parties argued against the importance of econometric indicators, and the
panel essentially upheld their view: based on elements such as, consumer preferences,
end uses of the product, the panel held that the products were indeed in a DCS‐
relationship. Only if cross‐price elasticity was the decisive criterion conferring DCS
status, would the panel had ruled otherwise, but such a reading of Art. III.2 GATT
was in the panel’s eyes unwarranted. The AB upheld the panel’s findings without any
modification in this respect. The factors that the AB took into account in order to
confirm the DCS‐relationship between soju and the western drinks, included
information concerning potential competition, and evidence from other markets ( in
this case the Japanese market) (§§ 114 ff. and especially 133–4, 135–8). This latter
approach (defining DCS‐relationship without having at all recourse to econometric
indicators) implies a lower burden for the complainant.

3.3.3.2 “So as to afford protection”
Case‐law regarding the interpretation of the “so as to afford protection” (SATAP)
requirement can be summarized as follows:

20

The price of non‐diluted soju was substantially higher.
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(a) There is a threshold issue: the tax differential must be more than de minimis, but
it is not clear what constitutes a de minimis difference);21
(b) A substantial tax differential will suffice in and of itself to establish a violation
of Art. III.2 GATT;
(c) Inconsistency with Art. III.2 GATT can be established even in case where the
tax differential is not substantial (but is more than de minimis). In such cases,
recourse to other factors is warranted. In Japan—Alcoholic Beverages II, the AB
distinguishes between subjective intent, and the purpose of a regulatory
intervention, as disclosed by objective features of the design of the measure; it is
the latter that matters for an analysis whether the SATAP‐requirement has been
met, and not the former. In Chile—Alcoholic Beverages, the AB confirmed that
objective regulatory purpose, that is, the purpose as revealed through the design
and architecture of the measure, matters for the analysis of the SATAP‐
requirement. At the same time, however, it did not establish any criteria as to
how it will evaluate the objective regulatory purpose, other than referring to
the design and the architecture of the measure at hand. It discussed summarily
the four regulatory objectives advanced as justification of the measure by Chile,
and it explicitly rejected the relevance of the necessity‐criterion when
evaluating a claim under Art. III GATT (§§ 71–2).

3.3.3.3 “Like Products” (Art. III.2 GATT)
GATT case‐law evidences two trends:

We can infer that infinitesimal tax differentials will satisfy the in excess—but not the SATAP—
criterion.
21
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(a) a number of cases that define like products through reference to consumer
reactions (e.g., Border Tax Adjustments and Japan—Alcoholic Beverages I); 22
(b) there are two cases which explicitly refer to regulatory intent when establishing
likeness among domestic and foreign products (US – Taxes on Automobiles, US –
Malt Beverages). These cases espouse the so‐called aims and effect‐test.

In the WTO‐era, the aims and effect‐test was explicitly rejected by the AB (Japan – Taxes
on Alcoholic Beverages II), holding that there was no place for intent‐analysis in Art. III
GATT. In the same report, the AB also held that for two products to be like they must
besides being DCS, also share the same tariff classification.

3.3.3.4 “In Excess”
The AB has stated that even a minimal tax differential suffices to satisfy the in excess
criterion. In Japan—Alcoholic Beverages II, the AB held (p. 23):

“Even the smallest amount of ‘excess’ is too much. ‘The prohibition of discriminatory
taxes in Article III:2, first sentence, is not conditional on a ‘trade effects test’ nor is it
qualified by a de minimis standard.” (italics in the original).

3.3.3.5 “Like Products” (Art. III.4 GATT)
In its report on EC—Asbestos, the AB dealt with a French decree which banned the
sales of asbestos‐containing construction material. The sales ban was non‐
discriminatory (asbestos containing‐construction material was banned, irrespective of
its origin). One of the questions before the panel (and the AB) was whether asbestos

So far, there is not one single case where supply‐substitutability has been accounted for when
defining likeness or DCS relationship.
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containing‐ and asbestos free‐construction material were like products. In order to
respond to this question, the AB had to first define the scope of like products. It held
that the term like in Art. III.4 GATT should be interpreted in light of the over‐arching
purpose of Art. III GATT: absent some parallelism in the coverage across the two
paragraphs (Art. III.2, 4 GATT), WTO Members would be in the position to
circumvent the prohibition to discriminate across DCS products through non‐fiscal
instruments. Understanding the two provisions to be co‐extensive was thus seen as
anti‐circumvention device. The AB held that the term like in Art. III.4 of the GATT
cannot have coverage wider than the combined coverage of the terms like and DCS
appearing in Art. III.2 GATT (§§ 98–100).

When it came to deciding whether the two products before it (Canadian asbestos
containing‐, and French asbestos free‐construction material) were indeed like, the AB
observed the differences in physical characteristics between the two products. In the
AB’s view, the composition of a product is very much part of the physical characteristics
analysis. Products containing chrysotile fibres are different from products containing
PCG fibres since the former are carcinogenic and the latter are not. It is not,
nonetheless, the difference in the actual physical characteristics of the products that
makes them unlike. It is the buyers’ perceptions – as estimated by the AB – regarding
the difference in risk associated with the two products that makes unlike (§§ 101–54).23
What more, these buyers of the imported material would often not be exposed to the
health risk, but would be indirectly affected, since their customers could be affected.
The AB held that the presence of health risk in asbestos containing‐construction material raised a
presumption that the two products were unlike. Canada was called to rebut this presumption (which,
in casu, Canada did not). In a separate but concurring opinion, an unnamed member of the AB held the
view, that the scientific proof cited in this case was sufficient to conclude that the two products were
unlike. One way to understand the need for a separate opinion is probably that, in this member’s eyes,
the difference in physical characteristics does not merely raise a presumption, but amounts to a home
run: Canada could never rebut such evidence.
23
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The finding of non‐likeness was hence based on the AB’s assessment of these
construction companies’ assessment of how the latter would be affected, through the
market mechanism, of the assessment of their customers of differences in risk.

The EC‐Asbestos dispute hence contains a novelty from a burden of proof point of
view that can have far‐reaching consequences for environmental disputes. In the
dispute, when making its likeness determination, the AB did not rely on studies or
information concerning actual buyer behaviour; the AB uses its own interpretation of
what buyer would do, if facing a choice between the two products:

In this case especially, we are also persuaded that evidence relating to consumers’
tastes and habits would establish that the health risks associated with chrysotile
asbestos fibres influence consumers’ behaviour with respect to the different fibres at
issue. We observe that, as regards chrysotile asbestos and PCG fibres, the consumer of the
fibres is a manufacturer who incorporates the fibres into another product, such as
cement‐based products or brake linings. We do not wish to speculate on what the
evidence regarding these consumers would have indicated; rather, we wish to
highlight that consumers’ tastes and habits regarding fibres, even in the case of
commercial parties, such as manufacturers, are very likely to be shaped by the health
risks associated with a product which is known to be highly carcinogenic. A
manufacturer cannot, for instance, ignore the preferences of the ultimate consumer of
its products. If the risks posed by a particular product are sufficiently great, the
ultimate consumer may simply cease to buy that product. This would, undoubtedly,
affect a manufacturer’s decisions in the marketplace. Moreover, in the case of products
posing risks to human health, we think it likely that manufacturers’ decisions will be
influenced by other factors, such as the potential civil liability that might flow from
marketing products posing a health risk to the ultimate consumer, or the additional
costs associated with safety procedures required to use such products in the
manufacturing process. (§ 122, italics in the original, underlining added).

In the preceding recital to the above quoted passage, the AB had noted:
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Furthermore, in a case such as this, where the fibres are physically very different, a
panel cannot conclude that they are ʺlike productsʺ if it does not examine evidence
relating to consumersʹ tastes and habits… (italics in original).

One would have thought that to “examine evidence” would amount to more than to
speculate about what buyers would do. To quote Horn and Weiler (2004):

An important link in the reasoning above, showing how the AB likeness criterion might
be viewed as only concerning market relations, was that buyers in this market would
take risk differences into account. This was based on an amazingly naïve belief in
working of market, according to which the buyers (who are not end users) had to do this
since they would otherwise lose customers. We do not want to suggest that this
knowledge on the preferences of the ultimate consumers would not be an important
factor limiting the usage of asbestos products. But there are a number of arguments to
suggest the potential for the exposure to asbestos to be higher than socially desirable.
For instance, because of costly information one should not expect all final consumers to
be fully informed about all hazards. There are likely to be severe negative externalities
associated with asbestos products, since final users of asbestos products may not care
about the negative health impact of their use of asbestos‐containing products for third
parties. For instance, asbestos in the brakes of an auto may not cause much of a health
hazard to the owner, but contributes to the spreading of asbestos in the air. Market
failures are also likely to arise from fixed costs in litigation. For instance, the health
damage from exposure to asbestos from a particular building might be limited, if it is a
building in which most people spend a very limited time. But being exposed to
asbestos in many such buildings may have severe negative consequences. But since
each individual only suffers minor damage from any particular building, it might not
pay to litigate. Or, the possibility of being sheltered by bankruptcy may adversely
affect buyer behavior. For all these reasons one should expect that products
containing asbestos are over‐consumed relative to what would be socially efficient if
the market is left unregulated. This is indeed precisely why the government
intervention is needed. It is the fact that buyers tend to treat the products as closer
substitutes than they are from the government’s point of view that motivates the
regulation.

The bottom‐line here is that the burden of persuasion to establish likeness across two
products one of which represents a risk to health can potentially be very high.
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3.3.3.6 “Less Favourable Treatment”
In the same report, the AB held that the term less favourable treatment (LFT) appearing
in Art. III.4 GATT echoes the principle set forth in Art. III.1 GATT: WTO Members
should not use domestic measures so as to afford protection to domestic production (§
100):

“The term ‘less favourable treatment’ expresses the general principle, in Article III:1,
that internal regulations ‘should not be applied … so as to afford protection to
domestic production.’ If there is ‘less favourable treatment’ of the group of ‘like’
imported products, there is, conversely, ‘protection’ of the group of ‘like’ domestic
products. However, a Member may draw distinctions between products which have
been found to be ‘like,’ without, for this reason alone, according to the group of ‘like’
imported products ‘less favourable treatment’ than that accorded to the group of ‘like’
domestic products.” (emphasis in the original).

Since however, the two products were found to be unlike, there was no need for the
AB to interpret this term.

3.3.3.7 Taking Stock
We can, thus, conclude that:

(a) the test to define whether two products are DCS is in the marketplace;
(b) there is no need for recourse to econometric indicators in order to establish a
DCS relationship;
(c) products are like if they are DCS and in addition share the same tariff
classification;24

In the words of the AB (Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II), it must be detailed enough, a criterion that will
be usually satisfied at the six digit‐level.
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(d) there is no necessity to use data concerning the actual market, if differences in
the composition of a product would obviously lead a “reasonable buyer” to
distinguish between two products. Note, however, that the AB did not make a
statement to the effect that any difference in the composition will suffice to raise
such a presumption: in EC – Asbestos, the AB was dealing with a difference
which could be detrimental to human health, according to sound scientific
evidence;
(e) if two goods are DCS, and the tax differential between them is substantial, then
Art. III.2 GATT has been violated. To establish a violation of Art. III.2 GATT
when there is no substantial tax differential across DCS products, the
complainant has to show a more than de minimis tax differential, and that the
objective intent of the tax scheme, as evidenced by its design, and overall
architecture, was to protect the domestic product;
(f) if two goods are like, and the consistency of a fiscal instrument with the GATT
is being challenged, all the complainant needs to show is that the domestic
good benefits from an even infinitesimally lower tax;
(g) if two goods are like, and the consistency of a non fiscal instrument with the
GATT is being challenged, the complainant needs to show that LFT is being
accorded to the foreign good. This term has not been interpreted as of yet, but
in light of the parallelism that case‐law has drawn between its function and
that of the SATAP‐requirement, one can legitimately take the view that the
conclusion under (e) above holds here as well.
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3.3.4 The Key Terms in Art. XI GATT
3.3.4.1 Import or Export Restriction
The most often cited Art. XI GATT case is Japan – Trade in Semiconductors, where a
GATT panel was called to adjudicate a complaint by the EC to the effect that, the
Japanese government, by providing incentives to its private sector to raise its prices
when exporting semiconductors to Europe (in order to conform to the Semiconductor
Pact that it had signed with the US), it had de facto imposed a quantitative restriction
(QR) on exports in violation of Art. XI GATT. According to the panel’s holding in this
case, all the complainant needs to show is that a QR has been in place: there is no need
to show that a numerical target has been set; the complainant needs to show that the
measure has a QR‐effect. This is a rather low standard, since, presumably, most
measures would have such an effect. But the complainant also needs to show that the
QR is attributable to the government. Without formally saying so, the panel accepted
a but for‐test, where the issue is whether a higher volume would have been imported
absent government involvement. In this vein, there is no need to show that the
government is the direct author of the challenged behaviour; it suffices that the
government has channeled certain behaviour (say a government loan at preferential
rates) through a private body (say a private bank). The complainant does not need to
demonstrate that the government mandated the challenged behaviour either; it suffices
to show that it provided the private entity with enough incentives to do so. This last
point was also made clear in the panel report on Japan – Trade in Semiconductors.

Note however, that a subsequent panel (Argentina – Hides and Leather) in its report
took a different view without however, explicitly reversing Japan – Trade in
Semiconductors. The claim by the EC, the complainant in this case, was that the
presence of representatives of the domestic downstream industry (leather products) at
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customs clearance procedures in Argentina, sufficed to establish a QR, by reducing
the incentives for the domestic upstream industry (hides) to allow exports, since
exporters of the raw material would risk being penalized by the domestic downstream
industry by refusing them sales. The panel stated that, for a successful legal challenge
to be mounted, the complainant must demonstrate a causal link between the measure
attacked and the (reduced) level of exports. A more demanding standard of review is,
hence, appropriate but what is this standard? The panel’s view is that a WTO Member
is under no obligation to eliminate all potential for a QR‐effect (§ 11.19):
We agree with the view expressed by the panel in Japan – Film. However, we do not
think that it follows either from that panelʹs statement or from the text or context of
Article XI:1 that Members are under an obligation to exclude any possibility that
governmental measures may enable private parties, directly or indirectly, to restrict
trade, where those measures themselves are not trade‐restrictive. [italics in the original]

In the case at hand, the panel rejected the EC claim, since all it had submitted was
evidence regarding the presence of downstream industry representatives during
customs clearance. The panel did not refute that such presence might have a
quantitative effect, but did not see this as sufficient evidence that a violation had
occurred. The panel report was not appealed.

3.3.5 The Key Terms in Art. XX GATT
3.3.5.1 Means Are Justiciable, Not Ends
The AB, in its report on Korea – Various Measures on Beef clarified (§ 176) the extent of
its judicial review of a measure, the legitimacy of which is being sought under Art.
XX(d) GATT. In doing so, it incorporated case‐law under Art. XX(b) GATT, at least
implicitly taking the view that the standard of review should be symmetric across the
various provisions of Art. XX GATT. The AB held that the judicial review has to be
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confined to the means used to achieve a particular objective, and cannot extend to an
examination of the legitimacy of the ends themselves:

It is not open to doubt that Members of the WTO have the right to determine for
themselves the level of enforcement of their WTO‐consistent laws and regulations. We
note that this has also been recognized by the panel in United States – Section 337,
where it said: ʺThe Panel wished to make it clear that this [the obligation to choose a
reasonably available GATT‐consistent or less inconsistent measure] does not mean that
a contracting party could be asked to change its substantive patent law or its
desired level of enforcement of that law …. ʺ. [italics and emphasis in the original].

Over the years, however, the AB made it clear that it would be more deferential when
human (life and) health was at stake, and less so when WTO Members were pursuing
other regulatory objectives mentioned in the body of Art. XX GATT. The AB first
announced in its report on Korea – Various Measures on Beef, that it would take into
account the importance of the objective sought when measuring the necessity of the
means employed to attain it. In its report on EC – Asbestos, the AB confirmed that this
was indeed the case (§ 172):

We indicated in Korea – Beef that one aspect of the ʺweighing and balancing process
… comprehended in the determination of whether a WTO‐consistent alternative
measureʺ is reasonably available is the extent to which the alternative measure
ʺcontributes to the realization of the end pursuedʺ. In addition, we observed, in that
case, that ʺ[t]he more vital or important [the] common interests or valuesʺ pursued, the
easier it would be to accept as ʺnecessaryʺ measures designed to achieve those ends.
In this case, the objective pursued by the measure is the preservation of human life
and health through the elimination, or reduction, of the well‐known, and life‐
threatening, health risks posed by asbestos fibres. The value pursued is both vital and
important in the highest degree.”[italics in the original]25
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See the analysis by Horn and Weiler (2007) in this respect.
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The AB, in its report on Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, underscored this point in the context of an
environmental dispute. The facts of the case are reproduced in § 118 of the report:

Tyres are an integral component in passenger cars, lorries, and airplanes and, as such,
their use is widespread in modern society. New passenger cars are typically sold with
new tyres. When tyres need to be replaced, consumers in some countries may have a
choice between new tyres or ʺretreadedʺ tyres. This dispute concerns the latter
category of tyres. Retreaded tyres are used tyres that have been reconditioned for
further use by stripping the worn tread from the skeleton (casing) and replacing it
with new material in the form of a new tread, and sometimes with new material also
covering parts or all of the sidewalls. Retreaded tyres can be produced through
different methods, one of which is called ʺremouldingʺ.

In the AB’s view, the relative importance is the starting point of necessity‐analysis (§
143):

In US – Gambling, the Appellate Body addressed the ʺnecessityʺ test in the context of
Article XIV of the GATS. The Appellate Body stated that the weighing and balancing
process inherent in the necessity analysis ʺbegins with an assessment of the ʹrelative
importanceʹ of the interests or values furthered by the challenged measureʺ, and also
involves an assessment of other factors, which will usually include ʺthe contribution of
the measure to the realization of the ends pursued by itʺ and ʺthe restrictive impact of
the measure on international commerceʺ. (italics in the original)

In this vein, the AB has accepted that the pursuance of a ‘zero risk’ policy is legitimate
when the risk involves human health (EC – Hormones), whereas it has outlawed a
Japanese measure allegedly aimed at protecting animal health in light of the
negligibility of the risk involved (Japan – Apples).
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3.3.5.2 “Necessary” (Art. XX(b) GATT)
Environmental disputes can conceivably come under either Art. XX(b), or Art. XX(g)
GATT. 26 Art. XX(b) GATT has been construed as extending to cover environmental
protection, although the term as such is not explicitly mentioned in the body of Art.
XX(b) GATT. For a measure to be consistent with Art. XX(b) GATT, it must be
necessary to achieve the ends pursued. The necessity‐requirement has been interpreted
in various GATT/WTO panels. In short, a measure is necessary if it is the least restrictive
(in terms of impact on international trade transactions) measure reasonably available
to the regulating state permitting it to achieve the intended result. There is abundant
case‐law regarding the interpretation of the necessity‐requirement:

First, case‐law has consistently held that the level of efficiency remains the
privilege of the regulating state. The necessity‐requirement requires an investigation of
the relationship between two elements: trade liberalization, and the objective pursued
by the regulating WTO Member; the measure ultimately chosen must allow a WTO
Member to pursue its objective while being the least restrictive on trade liberalization.
Crucial to this discussion, is that the alternative measure is as efficient as the one
chosen to achieve the objective pursued by the regulating state: adjudicating bodies
cannot impose on a regulating WTO Member a less efficient, but probably less
restrictive, measure, since it is up to WTO Members to unilaterally choose the level of
enforcement of the measure pursued (by virtue of the standard of review alluded to
above, according to which means are justiciable, ends are not, even if the degree of
deference by the WTO adjudicating body might vary depending on the objective
sought). The AB made this point clear in its report on EC – Asbestos (§§ 173 – 175):
Disputes can, in theory, come under Art. XX(d) GATT as well. This has never happened so far. But
even if it did, which we think is unlikely, the legal test for compliance is identical to that embedded in
Art. XX(b) GATT. Hence, there is no need to include a discussion on Art. XX(d) GATT as well.
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Canada asserts that ʺcontrolled useʺ represents a ʺreasonably availableʺ measure that
would serve the same end. The issue is, thus, whether France could reasonably be
expected to employ ʺcontrolled useʺ practices to achieve its chosen level of health
protection – a halt in the spread of asbestos‐related health risks.
In our view, France could not reasonably be expected to employ any alternative
measure if that measure would involve a continuation of the very risk that the Decree
seeks to ʺhaltʺ. Such an alternative measure would, in effect, prevent France from
achieving its chosen level of health protection. On the basis of the scientific evidence
before it, the Panel found that, in general, the efficacy of ʺcontrolled useʺ remains to be
demonstrated. Moreover, even in cases where ʺcontrolled useʺ practices are applied
ʺwith greater certaintyʺ, the scientific evidence suggests that the level of exposure can,
in some circumstances, still be high enough for there to be a ʺsignificant residual risk
of developing asbestos‐related diseases.ʺ The Panel found too that the efficacy of
ʺcontrolled useʺ is particularly doubtful for the building industry and for DIY
enthusiasts, which are the most important users of cement‐based products containing
chrysotile asbestos. Given these factual findings by the Panel, we believe that
ʺcontrolled useʺ would not allow France to achieve its chosen level of health protection
by halting the spread of asbestos‐related health risks. ʺControlled useʺ would, thus,
not be an alternative measure that would achieve the end sought by France.
For these reasons, we uphold the Panelʹs finding, in paragraph 8.222 of the Panel
Report, that the European Communities has demonstrated a prima facie case that there
was no ʺreasonably available alternativeʺ to the prohibition inherent in the Decree. As
a result, we also uphold the Panelʹs conclusion, in paragraph 8.223 of the Panel Report,
that the Decree is ʺnecessary to protect human … life or healthʺ within the meaning of
Article XX(b) of the GATT 1994. (italics and emphasis in the original)

In §171 of its report on Brazil‐Retreaded Tyres, the AB reproduced this analysis in an
environmental dispute:

We note that the objective of the Import Ban is the reduction of the ʺexposure to the
risks to human, animal or plant life or health arising from the accumulation of waste
tyresʺ and that ʺBrazilʹs chosen level of protection is the reduction of [these] risks ... to
the maximum extent possibleʺ, and that a measure or practice will not be viewed as an
alternative unless it ʺpreserve[s] for the responding Member its right to achieve its
desired level of protection with respect to the objective pursuedʺ.
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However, there is a presumption that recourse to import embargos should be allowed
only in exceptional circumstances. The AB held (Brazil – Retreaded Tyres) that, in
principle, such measures would be accepted only if it was proven that they have made
material contribution to the attainment of the stated objective (§ 150):
As the Panel recognized, an import ban is ʺby design as trade‐restrictive as can beʺ. We
agree with the Panel that there may be circumstances where such a measure can
nevertheless be necessary, within the meaning of Article XX(b). We also recall that, in
Korea – Various Measures on Beef, the Appellate Body indicated that ʺthe word
ʹnecessaryʹ is not limited to that which is ʹindispensableʹʺ. Having said that, when a
measure produces restrictive effects on international trade as severe as those resulting
from an import ban, it appears to us that it would be difficult for a panel to find that
measure necessary unless it is satisfied that the measure is apt to make a material
contribution to the achievement of its objective. Thus, we disagree with Brazilʹs
suggestion that, because it aims to reduce risk exposure to the maximum extent
possible, an import ban that brings a marginal or insignificant contribution can
nevertheless be considered necessary. [italics in the original]

In the same vein, the GATT panel on Thailand – Cigarettes explained that when faced
with a GATT‐consistent and a GATT‐inconsistent option, the WTO Member must
always choose the former, assuming, of course, that it does not prejudge the level of
efficiency sought. Borrowing from the case‐law under Art. XX(d) GATT, the panel
held that (§ 75):

The Panel concluded from the above that the import restrictions imposed by Thailand
could be considered to be ‘necessary’ in terms of article XX(b) only if there were no
alternative measure consistent with the General Agreement, or less inconsistent with it,
which Thailand could reasonably be expected to employ to achieve its health policy
objectives.
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Thailand had argued that its measure, which in practice amounted to a trade embargo
on the importation of cigarettes, was justified by the fact that it aimed at ensuring the
quality of cigarettes imported, while restricting the overall quantity sold in its market.
The panel felt that Thailand could have ensured both objectives through the use of
non‐discriminatory, and hence GATT‐consistent measures (bans on advertising, non‐
discriminatory labelling requirements, etc.). When the panel satisfied itself that
Thailand could indeed have reached its objectives by employing GATT‐consistent
measures, it found that Thailand had violated its obligations under Art. XX(b) GATT
(§ 81).

Second, the AB clarified, in § 178 of its report on EC—Asbestos, that WTO Members can,
but do not have to use scientific expertise in order to justify a regulatory intervention
through recourse to Art. XX(b) GATT. Furthermore, even if they rely on scientific
evidence, it does not have to represent the majority opinion in the relevant scientific
field:

In justifying a measure under Article XX(b) of the GATT 1994, a Member may also rely,
in good faith, on scientific sources which, at that time, may represent a divergent, but
qualified and respected, opinion. A Member is not obliged, in setting health policy,
automatically to follow what, at a given time, may constitute a majority scientific
opinion. Therefore, a panel need not, necessarily, reach a decision under Article XX(b)
of the GATT 1994 on the basis of the “preponderant” weight of the evidence.

Third, in the same report, the AB held that there is no need to quantify the
contribution of means to ends, for a measure to pass the consistency‐test with Art.
XX(b) GATT: a qualitative analysis, by and large, suffices (§ 146).
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Fourth, the AB held, in Korea – Various Measures on Beef, that necessary should not be
equated to indispensable, since, in its view, the term necessary in Art. XX(d) GATT refers
to a range of necessary options. The AB explained that it understands necessity to be on
one end of a logical continuum, and indispensability, on the other. The boundaries are
hard to define but it seems reasonable to conclude that, what the AB had in mind, was
to provide some leeway to the regulating WTO member by relaxing the standard of
review. In the words of the AB (§§ 161, 163, 164):

We believe that, as used in the context of Article XX(d), the reach of the word
“necessary” is not limited to that which is “indispensable” or “of absolute necessity”
or “inevitable”. Measures which are indispensable or of absolute necessity or
inevitable to secure compliance certainly fulfill the requirements of Article XX(d). But
other measures, too, may fall within the ambit of this exception. As used in Article
XX(d), the term “necessary” refers, in our view, to a range of degrees of necessity. At
one end of this continuum lies “necessary” understood as “indispensable”; at the
other end, is “necessary” taken to mean as “making a contribution to.” We consider
that a “necessary” measure is, in this continuum, located significantly closer to the
pole of “indispensable” than to the opposite pole of simply “making a contribution to”.
…
There are other aspects of the enforcement measure to be considered in evaluating that
measure as “necessary”. One is the extent to which the measure contributes to the
realization of the end pursued, the securing of compliance with the law or regulation
at issue. The greater the contribution, the more easily a measure might be considered
to be “necessary”. Another aspect is the extent to which the compliance measure
produces restrictive effects on international commerce, that is, in respect of a measure
inconsistent with Article III:4, restrictive effects on imported goods. A measure with a
relatively slight impact upon imported products might more easily be considered as
“necessary” than a measure with intense or broader restrictive effects.
In sum, determination of whether a measure, which is not “indispensable”, may
nevertheless be “necessary” within the contemplation of Article XX(d), involves in
every case a process of weighing and balancing a series of factors which prominently
include the contribution made by the compliance measure to the enforcement of the
law or regulation at issue, the importance of the common interests or values protected
by that law or regulation, and the accompanying impact of the law or regulation on
imports or exports. (italics in the original)
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It follows that measures which are not, strictly speaking, indispensable to reach the
objective pursued, might still qualify as necessary, depending on the circumstances.

Fifth, in its report on Korea – Various Measures on Beef, the AB held that the necessity‐
requirement should not be interpreted so as to force WTO Members to use measures
that are not reasonably available to them (§ 166):

In our view, the weighing and balancing process we have outlined is comprehended in
the determination of whether a WTO‐consistent alternative measure which the
Member concerned could ‘reasonably be expected to employ’ is available, or whether a
less WTO‐inconsistent measure is ‘reasonably available’.

What is reasonably available depends on endowments proper to the regulating state, it
is in other words an endogenous requirement. Case‐law has attempted to solve this
issue by deciding on the allocation of burden of production of proof, when the
question of reasonable availability arises. In US – Gambling, the AB explained the shift in
the burden of proof whenever the absolutely least restrictive measure is unavailable to
the regulating state (§§ 309 – 311). This is how the approach advocated in US ‐
Gambling would apply in the GATT‐context:27

(a) the party invoking Art. XX GATT will carry the initial burden to prove that its
measure is necessary;
(b) assuming it has established that this indeed is the case, the burden will shift to
the other party to show that there is another, equally efficient but less restrictive
option which, if privileged, would allow it to achieve its regulatory objective;
This is a GATS case. For an application of this standard in a GATT‐case, see the AB report on Brazil –
Retreaded Tyres, §§ 171ff.
27
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(c) assuming that an adequate demonstration has been made, the burden will shift
again and this time the regulating state will have to show that the less restrictive
option is not reasonably available to it.

To evaluate the reasonable availability of a measure:

…factors such as the trade impact of the measure, the importance of the interests
protected by the measure, or the contribution of the measure to the realization of the
end pursued, should be taken into account in the analysis…

can be taken into account. This is what the AB held in Dominican Republic – Import and
Sale of Cigarettes (§ 70). This is probably the most decisive attempt by the AB to make
sure that necessity does not operate as a stranglehold. By “endogenizing” the necessity
requirement, the AB showed its willingness to respect national idiosyncratic attributes.
The absolutely least restrictive measure might, for example, sometimes be a subsidy,
which could be simply unaffordable to a WTO Member with severe budgetary
constraints. The necessity‐requirement hence does not exclude the possibility that two
different WTO Members must use different means to comply with Art. XX GATT
while pursuing the same ends.

There has been divergent case‐law, concerning the issue whether it is for the panel to
come up with a reasonably available alternative, or whether it is up to the party
challenging the measure to do so. The panel on Canada—Wheat Exports and Grain
Imports is an example of the former approach, whereas the AB report on Japan—
Agricultural Products II (§§ 123–30) of the latter. This issue was resolved in the AB
report on US—Gambling, where, as discussed above, assuming that a prima facie case
has been made (that the necessity‐requirement has been met), the burden of proof
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shifts to the other party (the original complainant) who will have to demonstrate that
another, less restrictive (but equally effective) measure should have been privileged.

3.3.5.3 “Relating to” Conservation of “Exhaustible Natural Resources” (Art. XX(g)
GATT)
Environmental disputes can also come under Art. XX(g) GATT, which deals with
exhaustible natural resources. The AB, in its report on US—Shrimp held that the term
exhaustible natural resources should not be confined to non‐living resources. At dispute
was a US measure which banned the import of shrimps fished in a manner that led to
the accidental taking of the life of sea turtles. The US argued that its measure was in
full conformity with the requirements of Art. XX(g) GATT, and if not, anyway with
the requirements of Art. XX(b) GATT. The complainants (India, Malaysia, Pakistan,
and Thailand) argued that the negotiating history of the term exhaustible natural
resources pointed to the view that this term was meant to cover non‐living resources
only, minerals for example (§ 127, AB report).28 The question, thus, arose whether the
US measure should come under the purview of Art. XX(b), or Art. XX(g) GATT.29 The
first step in analyzing this claim is, of course, the question whether sea turtles are
indeed an exhaustible natural resource. In the view of the AB, the term must be given a
meaning in accordance with today’s perceptions (§ 130):

… the generic term ‘natural resources’ in Article XX(g) is not ‘static’ in its content or
reference, but is rather ‘by definition, evolutionary’.

28

On the negotiating history of this term see, inter alia, Matsushita et al. (2006), and Irwin et al. (2008).

As we will see shortly, the burden of persuasion under Art. XX(g) GATT is less demanding than that
under Art. XX(b) GATT. Hence, this was not a trivial issue, as the US attorneys had strong interest in
subjecting the measure under the less demanding standard.
29
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The AB went on to state that sea turtles, a living organism, could very well be
regarded as an exhaustible natural resource. International conventions (CITES)
recognizing sea turtles as endangered species, and others which use the term natural
resources to cover both living‐ and non‐living organisms (UNCLOS, United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea) were cited (§§ 130ff., AB report) in support (without,
however, prescribing in a definitive manner the legal relevance of such instruments in
the WTO legal order). The defining criterion (which distinguishes exhaustible from
non‐exhaustible natural resources) is, in the AB’s view, the response to the question
whether the item at hand is being depleted faster than it is being reproduced (§§ 128, 130
and 153):

Textually, Article XX(g) is not limited to the conservation of “mineral” or “non‐living”
natural resources. The complainants’ principal argument is rooted in the notion that
“living” natural resources are “renewable” and therefore cannot be “exhaustible”
natural resources. We do not believe that “exhaustible” natural resources and
“renewable” natural resources are mutually exclusive. One lesson that modern
biological sciences teach us is that living species, though in principle, capable of
reproduction and, in that sense, “renewable”, are in certain circumstances indeed
susceptible of depletion, exhaustion and extinction, frequently because of human
activities. Living resources are just as “finite” as petroleum, iron ore and other non‐
living resources.
…
From the perspective embodied in the preamble of the WTO Agreement, we note that
the generic term “natural resources” in Article XX(g) is not “static” in its content or
reference but is rather “by definition, evolutionary”. It is, therefore, pertinent to note
that modern international conventions and declarations make frequent references to
natural resources as embracing both living and non‐living resources.
…
The language [of the Preamble of the WTO Agreement] demonstrates a recognition by
WTO negotiators that optimal use of the world’s resources should be made in
accordance with the objective of sustainable development. As this preambular
language reflects the intentions of negotiators of the WTO Agreement, we believe it
must add colour, texture and shading to our interpretation of the agreements annexed
to the WTO Agreement, in this case, the GATT 1994. We have already observed that
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Article XX(g) of the GATT 1994 is appropriately read with the perspective embodied in
the above preamble. (italics in the original)

In US – Gasoline, the panel held that clean air was an exhaustible natural resource (§
6.37). The dispute related to the implementation by the US of its domestic legislation
known as the Clean Air Act of 1990 (CAA) and, more specifically, to the regulation
enacted by the USʹ Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) pursuant to that Act, to
control toxic and other pollution caused by the combustion of gasoline manufactured in
or imported into the US. The CAA had established two gasoline programs to ensure that
pollution from gasoline combustion did not exceed the 1990 levels, and that pollutants
in major population centres were reduced. A preliminary question was raised by the US
at the oral hearing concerning arguments made by Venezuela and Brazil in their
respective appelleesʹ submissions on the issues of whether clean air is an exhaustible
natural resource within the meaning of Art. XX(g) GATT. The AB agreed with the US
that the issue was not properly before it (pp. 10ff.). As a result, the AB did not rule on
this issue.

Two requirements must be cumulatively met for a measure protecting exhaustible
natural resources to be judged GATT‐consistent:

(a) it must be relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources; and
(b) it must be made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production
or consumption.

We take each point in turn. The panel in its report on US – Gasoline, went on to apply
the GATT panel’s on Herring and Salmon reasoning and conclusion as to the
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interpretation of the term relating to: in this panel’s view this term was tantamount to
the term primarily aimed. The AB disagreed. It noted in its report on US—Gasoline, that
past case‐law had constructed the term relating to akin to primarily aimed at. The AB
was not at ease, nonetheless, with this understanding of the term, even though the
parties to the dispute seemed to endorse it (pp 18 and 19):

All the participants and the third participants in this appeal accept that a measure
must be “primarily aimed at” the conservation of exhaustible natural resources in
order to fall within the scope of Article XX(g). Accordingly, we see no need to examine
this point further, save, perhaps, to note that the phrase “primarily aimed at” is not
itself treaty language and was not designed as a simple litmus test for inclusion or exclusion
from Article XX(g). (italics added)

In its report on US—Shrimp, the AB had anew the opportunity to express its views on
this issue. It held that relating to implied a rational connection between a measure and
the conservation of exhaustible natural resources, and nothing beyond that (§ 141):

In its general design and structure, therefore, Section 609 is not a simple, blanket
prohibition of the importation of shrimp imposed without regard to the consequences
(or lack thereof) of the mode of harvesting employed upon the incidental capture and
mortality of sea turtles. Focusing on the design of the measure here at stake, it appears
to us that Section 609, cum implementing guidelines, is not disproportionately wide in
its scope and reach in relation to the policy objective of protection and conservation of
sea turtle species. The means are, in principle, reasonably related to the ends. The
means and ends relationship between Section 609 and the legitimate policy of
conserving an exhaustible, and, in fact, endangered species, is observably a close and
real one. (italics in the original)

Arguably, the rational connection‐standard endorsed by the AB is more deferential
towards the regulating WTO Member than the previously employed primarily aimed‐
standard, since even measures which do not primarily aim at the conservation of
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exhaustible natural resources can be justified through recourse to Art. XX(g) GATT,
assuming that they have a rational connection with the objective stated in this provision.

Art. XX(g) GATT further requires that, when imposing trade restrictions to protect
exhaustible natural resources, WTO Members must also adopt measures aimed at
restricting domestic consumption or production (as the case may be). The AB, in its
report on US—Gasoline, explained that the requirement to demonstrate that import‐
restricting measures are taken in conjunction with domestic measures aiming at the
conservation of exhaustible natural resources is an even‐handedness requirement. It
went on to stress that there is no need for an effects‐test in order to comply with Art.
XX(g) GATT in this respect (pp 20–1):

… the clause “if such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on
domestic product or consumption” is appropriately read as a requirement that the
measures concerned impose restrictions, not just in respect of imported gasoline but
also with respect to domestic gasoline. The clause is a requirement of even‐handedness
in the imposition of restrictions, in the name of conservation, upon the production or
consumption of exhaustible natural resources.
… if no restrictions on domestically‐produced like products are imposed at all, and all
limitations are placed upon imported products alone, the measure cannot be accepted
as primarily or even substantially designed for implementing conservationist goals.
The measure would simply be naked discrimination for protecting locally‐produced
goods.
We do not believe … that the clause “if made effective in conjunction with restrictions
on domestic production or consumption” was intended to establish an empirical
“effects test” for the availability of the Article XX(g) exception. (italics in the original)30

An example of an even‐handed measure is offered in §§ 144–5 of the AB report on US—Shrimp. The
AB, in its report on US—Shrimp faced, inter alia, the question whether Art. XX(g) GATT includes a
jurisdictional limit, in the sense that WTO Members can intervene to protect exhaustible natural resources
only within their jurisdiction, as the latter is defined by public international law. Nationality and
territoriality are the two most common bases, in public international law, for exercising jurisdiction:
30
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3.4 Concluding Remarks on GATT Case-Law
The allocation of the burden of production under current case‐law seems reasonable:
it should be for the complainant to contest the consistency of a measure with the
GATT obligations included in Art. III, XI GATT, and to the defendant to justify, if
need be, its measures through recourse to Art. XX GATT. So much should be clear.
The problem we detect is with respect to the burden of persuasion that WTO
adjudicating bodies have imposed on parties carrying the burden of proof.

The rather “light” burden of persuasion imposed on the complainant has been a
contributing factor towards some (type I) errors, where the WTO adjudicating bodies
have outlawed practices that, on the evidence submitted, it should be hard to outlaw.
Here are some highly, in our view, illustrative examples:

under the former, a state can regulate behaviour of its nationals; under the latter, a state can regulate
transactions taking place in its territory. Public international law practice gives the edge to the latter,
when a conflict between the two arises. On the other hand, one further distinguishes between objective
and subjective territoriality: the former captures activities occurring within national frontiers; the latter
captures activities which occur in state A, but which affect state B. B could legitimately, by virtue of
subjective territoriality (effects doctrine) punish, for example, A’s export cartels which cartelize its own
(B’s) market. Indeed, except for some extreme cases, state A would have little incentive to regulate the
behaviour of an export cartel operating from its market but affecting the rest of the world. Antitrust
advocacy usually attributes such inactivity to the fact that domestic antitrust laws are there to protect
domestic (as opposed to foreign) consumers’ welfare. On this issue, see Horn and Mavroidis (2008).In §
133 of its report on US—Shrimp, the AB avoided responding directly to the question whether the US
measure respected the territoriality‐principle:
We do not pass upon the question of whether there is an implied jurisdictional limitation in
Article XX(g), and if so, the nature or extent of that limitation. We note only that in the specific
circumstances of the case before us, there is a sufficient nexus between the migratory and
endangered marine populations involved and the United States for purposes of Article XX(g).
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3.4.1 Korea – Alcohol DS75
The dispute in a nutshell: The EC and the US complain about the taxation of alcoholic
drinks in Korea. Korea taxes one form of soju (diluted soju), which is a predominantly
Korea‐produced alcoholic drink, substantially lower than it taxes whisky and other
drinks. The taxation scheme does not condition the tax treatment on the origin of the
product. Still, the complainants claim that, because soju is predominantly produced in
Korea, whereas the drinks produced on the higher tax‐ebb are predominantly
produced in western countries, the differential taxation amounts to de facto
discrimination in favour of soju.

Evidence submitted by the complainants: Complainants produced one econometric
study, the Dodwell study (§§ 5.92 and 5.143 of the report) on the cross‐price elasticity
between soju and a series of western drinks. They further submitted other evidence
where econometric indicators play almost no role: a test report by the Scotch Whisky
Research Institute (§ 5.55), the Hankook study (§5.248), the Trendscope survey (§
6.126), the Andrikopoulos and Holm studies (§ 6.202), and a US Embassy
investigation (§ 6.334), which all make the point that western drinks will be competing
with soju in the Korean market. With the absence of the Dodwell study, all other pieces
of evidence are either a collection of small, un‐representative samples of consumer
reactions, or mere projections as to what exporters of alcoholic drinks to Korea should
be expecting in terms of market response. Complainants, finally, produced a trade
journal (§ 6.197), and promotional materials from the Korean company Jinro (§§ 6.180
and 6.200), which show that the company was advertising soju next to diluted soju as a
potential competitor to western drinks.

Counter‐evidence by the defendant: Korea concentrated its efforts on the Dodwell
study. It first argued that there can be no cross‐price elasticity between soju and
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western drinks, in light of the fact that the price of soju is a small fraction (5%) of the
price of the western drinks reviewed. Korea hired an economist (Brian Hindley), who
prepared a report (Hindley/Lexecon) arguing that the Dodwell study was of very poor
quality from an econometric point of view (§§ 5.210 – 5.229). Other studies (Sofres
report (§ 5.230) and Nielsen study (§ 6.219), as well as national tax records (§ 3.35 –
3.61), media articles and advertisement material (§§ 3.57 – 3.61) and sales data from
Jinro (§ 5.57) showed that the two products were for tax purposes treated as different
products; but also, from the producers’ perspective, the two products were destined
to different segments of the market.

Evaluation by the AB: The AB upheld all of the panel’s findings in this respect. It
essentially reduced the importance of econometric indicators when it comes to
showing likeness, arguing that cross‐price elasticity is not the decisive criterion in this
exercise. Implicitly, it set aside the evidence submitted by the complainants (Dodwell
study) and its rebuttal by Korea (Hindley/Lexecon study). Having relegated price to an
issue of less importance the AB found that soju and western drinks were DCS
products (since they shared the same end use and consumers would treat them alike;
they also had more or less the same appearance; and they were DCS in other
markets). 31 The panel and the AB did not specify, whether this conclusion was
warranted in light of the studies submitted by the complainants (mere projections of
future behaviour, most of them). They did underline however, that evidence from
another market (Japan) suggested that this should be the case since, a very similar to
soju Japanese product (sochu) was being treated as DCS‐product to western drinks by
Japanese consumers, and the WTO adjudicating bodies have already formally
pronounced on this issue to this effect (DS8). Having established DCS‐relationship
The panel first, and the AB subsequently, accepted that evidence from the Japanese market where
sochu, a product similar to soju, and western drinks were in DCS‐relationship, was relevant.

31
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between the two products, the AB found against Korea in light of the differential
taxation imposed. As shown above, the standard of review applicable to Art. III GATT
cases does not require, as a matter of evidence, to demonstrate either effects on the
market (income loss for exporters) or intent of the intervening government: it suffices
that two goods have been found to be DCS and that the taxation imposed is not the
same.

Our evaluation: The WTO adjudicating erred in treating diluted soju and western
drinks as DCS‐products. In this case, the panel and the AB disregarded evidence from
the Korean market, and used evidence from the Japanese market to show that a
product resembling soju (the Japanese sochu) was in DCS relationship with a series of
western drinks. Neither the panel nor the AB however, paid any attention to the
substantial price differential between diluted soju and sochu (a point forcefully argued
by Korea), and as a result, found that a DCS relationship existed in spite of this price
differential. The complainants had a rather easy burden to observe since price was not
an issue in establishing DCS‐relationship. Because of this error, the rest of their
analysis is wrong as well. As we have argued elsewhere32, econometric indicators
might not always yield satisfactory responses. Indeed there is some evidence to this
effect in antitrust analysis (when constructing the relevant product market). They are
however, a necessary first step. To the extent that Art. III.2 GATT is there to punish
protectionist behaviour, and to the extent that for behaviour to be judged
protectionist, one has to first establish that a pair of products participate in the same
product‐market and are being differently taxed, the first step of the analysis should
have been the proper construction of the relevant product market. This did not
happen here.

32

Horn and Mavroidis (2004).
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3.4.2 Chile – Alcohol DS87
The dispute in a nutshell: Chile’s tax on alcoholic beverages was a function of
alcoholic content: the higher the alcoholic content, the higher the tax. The EC and the
US complained that this scheme operated so as to afford protection to domestic
production: most of the beverages benefiting from low tax were of Chilean origin
(pisco), whereas the opposite was true for drinks such as whisky etc. The tax scheme
was origin‐neutral, in the sense that low alcoholic content‐beverages wherever
produced would benefit from the favourable tax burden. Consequently, if at all, the
tax scheme afforded de facto discrimination to domestic products. Chile chose not to
discuss the policy rationale for its scheme before the panel, but maintained that the
scheme was non‐discriminatory by any reasonable benchmark since most of the
products taxed at the higher ebb were of Chilean origin.

Evidence submitted by the complainant: The EC, which took a leading role among
complainants in this case, submitted evidence suggesting that Chilean products at the
lower ebb (pisco) and at the higher ebb (whisky) were priced pre‐tax at more or less
identical levels (SM Price Survey reflected in §§ 4.75 and 7.34 of the panel report);
evidence that Chilean producers of pisco viewed their products as competitors to
whisky etc. (§§ 4.119 – 124, 7.46, 4.240, 4.257 – 258); the Adimark Survey (§ 4.249) which
again pointed to the direction that pisco and whisky compete in the same relevant
product market; actions by Chilean antitrust authorities, from which it follows that
pisco and whisky compete in the same relevant product market (§ 4.265); and, finally,
some excerpts from discussions before the Chilean law‐making bodies evidencing the
legislative intent behind the tax scheme (§§ 4.563, 4.580).
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Counter‐evidence by the defendant: Chile submitted little counter‐evidence.
Essentially, Chile maintained that the fact that the pre‐tax price of two products is
similar does not mean that they necessarily have to be burdened by the same tax as
well. Chile pointed out that the system was not only intended to be non
discriminatory, but that it was non discriminatory de facto as well: most of the
products taxed at the higher ebb were of Chilean origin. In light of this evidence, Chile
thought that no claim that the tax scheme operated so as to afford protection could be
upheld. Chile also produced two studies (the Nielsen study § 4.139, and a regression
analysis § 4.180) showing that some pisco was not operating in the same market as
some high priced western alcoholic drinks.

Evaluation by the AB: Both the panel and the AB upheld the claims by the
complainants. In their view, since the products at the higher and the lower ebb were
DCS, and they were dissimilarly taxed, Chile was in violation of its obligation under
Art. III.2 GATT. The fact that most of the products at the higher ebb were of Chilean
origin, was simply immaterial; it sufficed that some of the products at the higher ebb
were imported and most of their counterparts in the low ebb were domestic. The AB
repeated that no effects analysis is required under Art. III.2 GATT. It also stated that
intent could be relevant, if the tax difference in itself would not suffice to show
discrimination. This was hardly the case here as the tax differential was quite
substantial. On the other hand, Chile had not advanced any health‐related arguments
to defend its taxation either. In a rather cryptic sentence, the AB seems to suggest that
it is not the progressive taxation scheme that it is opposed to, but rather the
‘sharpness’ in progression (the AB felt that from one tax category to another, the
progress in tax burden was geometric).
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Our evaluation: in Horn and Mavroidis (2004), we have already voiced our
disagreement with this outcome. In a nutshell, we believe that this outcome is largely
the result of the no effect‐, no intent‐test. Although we admit that we lack an
operational definition of protection, we simply fail to conceive a reasonable standard
by which one can strike down the Chilean legislation at hand: an effects‐standard
does not support the findings, since most of the products hit by the higher taxation are
Chilean. An intent‐test was never discussed. Moreover, were one to see something in
the AB’s sentences on the ‘sharpness’ of the tax differentials, one would have to do
away with the intrinsic character of Art. III.2 GATT: for a WTO adjudicating body to
be in a position to dictate the optimal tax burden, one would have to construe Art. III
GATT as an instrument of positive‐ rather than negative integration. This
understanding of Art. III GATT however, is at odds with both the text and its spirit.33
So the complainant did not have to produce any study regarding the effects of the
taxation, or evidence regarding the regulatory intent: they prevailed by showing that
some whisky was taxed higher than some pisco.

3.4.3 Korea – Beef DS161
The dispute in a nutshell: Korea had requested and was granted authorization to
impose a QR on beef. The legality of the QR was not at dispute in this case.
Subsequent to this authorization, Korea went ahead and imposed a dual retail system:
economic operators were free to choose whether they would carry domestic or
imported beef, but could not simultaneously carry both.34 The rationale for this regime
was, in Korea’s eyes, the need to protect the consumer who could be subjected to

See the critique of Ehring (2002) against the AB report.
With very few exceptions: some mega‐stores could do so, provided that the two categories of beef
were sold in different counters. No claim concerning discrimination resulting from this differential
treatment was tabled however.
33
34

47

fraudulent practices: in light of the substantial price differential between the US and
Korean beef (the former being substantially cheaper than the latter), and the
impossibility to distinguish which is which in a store, the dual retail system
guaranteed consumer protection since Korean authorities would know who sells what
and traders had to display the origin of the beef sold in their premises. The US and
Australia led the complaint arguing that the Korean regime was in violation of Art.
III.4 GATT, since it treated imported beef less favourably than domestic beef. In their
view, this was the case since only a few outlets (± 5,000) were selling imported beef
whereas many more (± 45,000) were selling domestic beef. Korea rebutted the claims
arguing that the number of outlets was the direct consequence of the legal quota in
place; that the complainants provided no evidence as to the size, location etc. of the
outlets selling domestic and foreign beef; that it had absorbed all of the quota over the
years, with one exception (1997, when, as a result of the financial crisis, the overall
consumption of beef had fallen dramatically); and that most importantly economic
operators were free to choose between an outlet selling either domestic or foreign
beef.

Evidence submitted by the complainant: the evidence submitted concentrated on
excerpts from discussions before the National Assembly (§ 4.98, 6.68), governmental
press releases (§ 2.21), pointing to the fact that the rationale behind the adoption of the
dual retail system was to protect domestic beef. Media articles were supplied as well
(§§ 7.29 – 7.30) which essentially made the same point. Trade statistics were offered
laying out the number of outlets selling domestic and foreign beef.

Counter‐evidence by the defendant: Korea adopted two lines of defense: it first
claimed that no violation of Art. III.4 GATT had occurred since traders could freely
choose the type of outlet they wanted to operate; the law provided equal
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opportunities and equal burden to both types of outlets. Korea also pointed to the fact
that no damage resulted for exporters because of the regime, since the quota had
always been absorbed. 35 Korea requested from the panel and the AB to ignore
information about the number of outlets, since in its view this was the direct outcome
of the QR in place, the legality of which with the GATT was not an issue in the
dispute. It stated that its laws were anyway consistent under Art. XX(d) GATT, since
they aimed at protecting consumers from fraudulent practices. Besides the law itself,
Korea submitted evidence from its preparatory work where the rationale for its
enactment was made explicit (§ 237 in the AB report).

Evaluation by the Appellate Body: The panel found for the complainants, basing itself
on the number of outlets as the most relevant piece of evidence. The AB in important
part disagreed with the panel report, without however, reversing it. In its view, Korea
was wrong because it modified the conditions of competition subsequent to the
negotiation of a concession to the disadvantage of the imported goods. On the other
hand, Korea’s measures could not be justified as being necessary to protect
consumers, since in the AB’s view Korea should have chosen another (un‐identified)
option which would be less restrictive on international trade transactions. The AB was
quick to point out that it was not by virtue of this judgment outlawing private
practices with more or less the same effect, such as single branding etc.

Our evaluation: We believe that the AB erred in this case. Its judgment confuses
violation with non‐violation complaints. WTO Members are of course, free to modify
conditions of competition any time they deem it appropriate, provided that they do
not discriminate between domestic and imported goods when doing so. Was Korea

35

With the exception mentioned above.
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discriminating? As the case was argued, it is difficult to make this claim. The number
of outlets was most likely, the direct outcome of the quota in place: the imported beef
could satisfy only a small fraction of the demand; most traders would be interested in
carrying the more expensive domestic beef. In the absence of any evidence on the
location, dimensions of outlets, the claim looks even more fragile. The complainants
prevailed essentially by pointing to the number of outlets without showing why the
number should be attributable to the dual retail system.

The cases mentioned above are mere illustrations. They share one element in common:
the complainant prevailed essentially because of the ‘light’ burden of persuasion that
it was requested to produce. We will discuss the rationale for the misallocation of
burden of persuasion in Section 5.

4 Burden of Proof in TBT/SPS Disputes
We next turn to BoP issues in the case law on TBT/SPS.

4.1 The Law
The TBT/SPS agreements, hailed as the ‘new generation’ agreements, deal with a sub‐
set of domestic instruments which are frequently geared towards environmental
protection and protection of human health. Two types of instruments come under the
scope of the TBT, technical regulations, compliance with which is compulsory, and
standards, compliance with which is optional. Usually, a technical regulation (or a
standard) defines specific product characteristics, such as size, shape, design,
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functions, performance, labelling or packaging, as well as related process and
production standards. The SPS coverage extends to measures aiming to protect public
health, but also animal and plant health (e.g., environment) from the entry and spread
of diseases. There is an overlap between these two agreements and Art. III GATT
(which as we saw deals with all domestic instruments). The legal requirements for
compliance vary across the three agreements (GATT, TBT, SPS). It cannot be thus
excluded that the same transaction can come under any of these three agreements. The
legal discipline, on the other hand, varies across these agreements: as we saw, the
GATT requests that domestic measures are non discriminatory; the TBT requests from
WTO Members to ensure that their technical regulations are not only non
discriminatory, but further necessary for the attainment of the objective pursued (Art.
2.2 TBT); the SPS adds to these two requirements: SPS measures must be consistent
(Art. 5.5 SPS), and in principle, based on scientific evidence (Art. 5.1 SPS). Note,
nonetheless, that the SPS allows for the adoption of measures on precautionary
grounds, even in the absence of scientific evidence (Art. 5.7 SPS).36 In light of the
overlap of the factual situation coming under the aegis of the three agreements and
the differing legal requirements for compliance the question of hierarchy across the
three agreements becomes imperative. Art. 1.5 TBT states that, in case of overlap
between the TBT and the SPS, the latter prevails. Case‐law has clarified that in case of

36

The proliferation of non tariff barriers (NTB) aiming to protect public health, environment is a given.
Increasingly traders have to face similar obstacles, especially because societies are not symmetrically
risk‐averse. They are also areas where there have been many abuses in the regulatory process: were one
to use the number of disputes as proxy for this observation, one can only be astounded by the number
of litigation that concern foodstuff and drinks. Public health and environment are areas where, at least
in some parts of the world, the regulatory process has been heavily influenced by scientific progress, as
a reaction to prior abuses.
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overlap between the TBT and the GATT, it is the former that prevails (AB, EC –
Asbestos, EC – Sardines).37 Hence, the solution is SPS over TBT over GATT.

Both the TBT and the SPS recognize the relevance of international standards (IS) that
have been negotiated, outside the WTO, in standard setting institutions such as the
ISO, and the Codex Alimentarius. WTO Members must, in principle, observe an IS that
can appropriately take care of their regulatory objective.

4.2 Burden of Production in TBT/SPS Disputes
In this section we will briefly consider the question of which party will lose, if neither
party provides the court with sufficient evidence to fulfill a burden of persuasion
target?

4.2.1 The General Rule
The discussion above is relevant here as well. The only additional issue is whether the
allocation of the burden of production should be identical, irrespective whether we
are in presence or absence of IS.

4.2.2 Unilateral Technical Regulations (Standards)/SPS Measures
So far there has been no case that directly addressed this issue. The allocation of the
burden of proof in EC – Sardines is, nonetheless, relevant for our discussion here since
the EC, by deviating from an IS, essentially adopted a unilateral measure: the AB
allocated the burden of proof on the complainant in a case where the defendant had
deviated from an IS, and justifying its choice arguing that it saw no reason why the
allocation of the burden of production should be any different when a WTO Member
37

See Horn and Weiler (2007a).
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had deviated from an IS. It follows, that the default allocation of the burden of
production is to the complainant challenging the consistency of a technical regulation
with the TBT (AB report, at § 282). Note however, that the panel had sided with an
argument by Peru to the effect that, it would be impossible for it to pronounce on the
reasons why the defendant found it inappropriate or ineffective to base its law on the
IS (AB report, at § 269). The AB disagreed and reversed the panel in this respect. In its
view, there were sufficient transparency requirements embedded in the TBT, that
would allow Peru to know the rationale behind the decision by the EC authorities to
deviate from the IS (AB report, at § 277). Moreover, the AB held that, Peru could
supplement its information on this score at the panel stage, since parties to the dispute
are requested to provide information about the design and the rationale of their
regulatory interventions (AB report, at § 280).

The solution is the same in the SPS‐context. It is for the complaining party to
demonstrate that a unilateral SPS measure is:

(a) non‐discriminatory;
(b) based on scientific evidence;
(c) necessary to achieve the stated objective; and
(d) consistent (with other SPS measures adopted by the same WTO Member).38

See, for example, the panel and AB reports on Australia – Salmon. The solution is the same if the
challenged measure was adopted on precaution, see the panel and AB reports on Japan – Agricultural
Products II.

38
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4.2.3 International Standards
Peru, in EC – Sardines, had argued that an IS existed which explained under what
conditions the name sardine should be used, and that the EC had deviated from it.
Peru expected that the burden of proof would then shift to the EC, a reasonable
expectation in light of the wording of Art. 2.4 TBT:

Where technical regulations are required and relevant international standards exist or
their completion is imminent, Members shall use them, or the relevant parts of them,
as a basis for their technical regulations except when such international standards or
relevant parts would be an ineffective or inappropriate means for the fulfillment of the
legitimate objectives pursued, for instance because of fundamental climatic or
geographical factors or fundamental technological problems.

We noted above, however, that the AB did not shift the burden of proof to the
defendant. The solution in the TBT‐ is symmetric to that in the SPS‐context. Indeed it
was an SPS panel that first solved this issue in this way. The panel, in its report on EC
– Hormones (US), found that the burden rested with the deviating party (the EC) to
prove that its deviation from the relevant international standard was justified under
the SPS.39 It held to this effect (§§ 8.86ff.):

Article 3.2…specifies that the complaining party has the burden of overcoming a
presumption of consistency with the SPS Agreement in the case of a measure based on
international standards. It thereby suggests by implication that when a measure is not
so based, the burden is on the respondent to show that the measure is justified under the
exceptions provided for in Article 3.3. (emphasis added)

The AB disagreed and reversed this finding. In its view, WTO Members that choose to
Abdel Motaal (2004) provides an excellent account how the international standard at hand was
prepared and adopted.
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deviate from an IS should not be penalized for their decision to do so (§ 102):

… The presumption of consistency with relevant provisions of the SPS Agreement that
arises under Article 3.2 in respect of measures that conform to international standards
may well be an incentive for Members so to conform their SPS measures with such
standards. It is clear, however, that a decision of a Member not to conform a particular
measure with an international standard does not authorize imposition of a special or
generalized burden of proof upon that Member, which may, more often than not,
amount to a penalty. (italics and emphasis in the original).

4.3 Burden of Persuasion in TBT/SPS Disputes:
We now turn the question of how much should the party carrying the burden of
production prove in order to fulfill this burden?

4.3.1 The General Rule
Our discussion in Section 3 on this score is relevant here as well.

4.3.2 The Standard of Review
Our discussion in Section 3 on this score is relevant here as well.

4.3.3 Unilateral Technical Regulations (Standards)/SPS Measures
No case has been litigated in the TBT context.

There has been some activity in the SPS‐context. Our discussion in Section 3 on non
discrimination, and necessity is relevant here as well. We will hence, limit our
discussion to the remaining two requirements: scientific evidence, and consistency.
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Scientific evidence: In its report on EC – Hormones (US), the AB explained that there
must be a rational connection between the (science‐based) risk assessment and the SPS
measure eventually adopted, in the sense that the former must reasonably support the
latter (§ 193):

… We believe that Article 5.1, when contextually read as it should be, in
conjunction with and as informed by Article 2.2 of the SPS Agreement, requires
that the results of the risk assessment must sufficiently warrant – that is to say,
reasonably support – the SPS measure at stake. The requirement that an SPS
measure be ʺbased onʺ a risk assessment is a substantive requirement that there
be a rational relationship between the measure and the risk assessment. (italics
in the original).40

Crucial to the understanding of this obligation is the prior understanding of the terms
risk and science. Whereas some progress has been made in case‐law regarding the
former, little if any progress has been made with respect to the latter. Scientific
evidence will need to point to a risk. In EC—Hormones (US) the AB made two
important clarifications regarding the definition of risk. First, it explained that the risk
must be identifiable, as opposed to a mere hypothetical possibility (§ 186):

… In one part of its Reports, the Panel opposes a requirement of an “identifiable risk”
to the uncertainty that theoretically always remains since science can never provide
absolute certainty that a given substance will not ever have adverse health effects. We

This view has been repeatedly confirmed in case‐law. The AB, for example, in its report on Japan—
Agricultural Products II held that, as per Art 5.2 SPS, a legal requirement is imposed on WTO Members
to provide a rational relationship between the SPS measure enacted, and the available scientific evidence
that exists (§ 84). See the excellent analysis in Dunoff (1999) and (2005) on this score.
40
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agree with the Panel that this theoretical uncertainty is not the kind of risk which,
under Article 5.1, is to be assessed. (emphasis in the original).41

Second, the AB held the view that the risk envisaged in the SPS Agreement is not just a
laboratory risk but a real life risk that takes into account behavioural factors (§ 187):

… It is essential to bear in mind that the risk that is to be evaluated in a risk assessment
under Article 5.1 is not only risk ascertainable in a science laboratory operating under
strictly controlled conditions, but also risk in human societies as they actually exist, in
other words, the actual potential for adverse effects on human health in the real world
where people live and work and die.42

In this vein, the panel in its report on Japan—Apples (Art 21.5—US), dismissed the
relevance of two studies presented to it, because they did not correspond to natural
conditions (§§ 8.65 and 8.140ff). It is difficult to define what science is, as a matter of
WTO law. In EC—Hormones (US), the AB held the view that the scientific evidence that
should be evaluated in the risk assessment, need not be understood as a requirement to
base SPS measures solely on the prevailing opinion in the relevant scientific field. In
its view, SPS measures based on minority scientific opinions could very well be
deemed to be WTO consistent (§ 194). In US – Suspended Concession, the AB summarily
suggested that evidence will be considered scientific if it respects the methodological

41

This statement is hardly supported in scientific discourse: when reference is made to risk assessment,
one usually knows the distribution of probabilities that the risk might occur; there is, thus, certainty as to
the probability that a risk might occur say 30% of the time a certain action takes place. Societies wanting
to take measures when there is uncertainty as to whether a risk might occur, are not risk‐averse, but
ambiguity‐averse societies. The two concepts are related but are not identical. Ambiguity‐aversion is
probably what is captured by the precautionary principle, which we discuss infra. On this issue, see
Gollier et al. (2000), and also Sunstein (2002).
The panel in its report on Japan—Apples (Art 21.5—US) dismissed the relevance of two studies,
because they did not correspond to natural conditions, see §§ 8.65 and 8.140ff.
42
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requirements of the scientific field where it belongs. Beyond this statement, there is
nothing much in WTO case‐law so far.43

The term risk assessment is defined in Annex A § 4 to the SPS in the following terms:
Risk assessment ‐ The evaluation of the likelihood of entry, establishment or spread of a
pest or disease within the territory of an importing Member according to the sanitary
or phytosanitary measures which might be applied, and of the associated potential
biological and economic consequences; or the evaluation of the potential for adverse
effects on human or animal health arising from the presence of additives,
contaminants, toxins or disease‐causing organisms in food, beverages or feedstuffs.
(italics in the original).

There are, thus, two kinds of risk assessment: all risks arising from the presence of
additives, contaminants, toxins or disease‐causing organisms in food, beverages or
feedstuffs, must be assessed and their potential effects on human or animal life
evaluated (risk assessment I); on the other hand, as far as pests or diseases are concerned,
the SPS Agreement provides for assessment of the likelihood of a pest or disease
entering, establishing and spreading and the associated potential biological and
economic consequences (risk assessment II). Whereas it is the potential effects that must
be assessed in risk assessment I, it is the likelihood of a pest entering a particular
market that must be assessed in risk assessment II. There are different evidentiary
standards associated with the two terms (potential, likelihood), and thus, with the two
types of risk assessment. There is an element of commonality as well. The AB
provided, in its report on Australia – Salmon, its understanding of the duty to perform
risk assessment in the following terms (§ 121):

Concurring with this opinion, Trebilcock, and Soloway (2001). In other regimes, the discussion has
been more forthcoming, see for example the Daubert jurisprudence of the US Supreme Court.
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… a risk assessment within the meaning of Article 5.1 must:

(1)
identify the diseases whose entry, establishment or spread a Member wants to
prevent within its territory, as well as the potential biological and economic
consequences associated with the entry, establishment or spread of these diseases;
(2)
evaluate the likelihood of entry, establishment or spread of these diseases, as well
as the associated potential biological and economic consequences; and
(3)
evaluate the likelihood of entry, establishment or spread of these diseases
according to the SPS measures which might be applied. (emphasis in the original).

In EC – Hormones (US), the AB dissociated the two types of risk assessment. In this
case, the EC had banned the sale of (domestic and imported) hormone‐treated beef.
The US protested against the ban, arguing that there was no scientific basis for the
ban. The EC claimed that its measures were indeed backed by scientific evidence, and
the issue in dispute was whether the EC had properly conducted a risk assessment. In
resolving this issue, the AB had to, inter alia, first articulate its understanding of the
term likelihood and potential, and subsequently explain the differences in the
evidentiary standards under consideration (§§ 123 – 124). The AB determined that
likelihood was a more demanding standard than potential (§§ 183 – 184):
Interpreting [paragraph 4 of Annex A of the SPS Agreement], the Panel elaborates risk
assessment as a two‐step process that ʺshould (i) identify the adverse effects on human
health (if any) arising from the presence of the hormones at issue when used as growth
promoters in meat …, and (ii) if any such adverse effects exist, evaluate the potential or
probability of occurrence of such effectsʺ.
… Although the utility of a two‐step analysis may be debated, it does not appear to us to
be substantially wrong. What needs to be pointed out at this stage is that the Panelʹs use
of ʺprobabilityʺ as an alternative term for ʺpotentialʺ creates a significant concern. The
ordinary meaning of ʺpotentialʺ relates to ʺpossibilityʺ and is different from the ordinary
meaning of ʺprobabilityʺ. ʺProbabilityʺ implies a higher degree or a threshold of
potentiality or possibility. It thus appears that here the Panel introduces a quantitative
dimension to the notion of risk. (emphasis in the original).
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Consequently, the standard with respect to risk assessment II (pests, diseases etc.) is
more demanding on the regulating WTO Member.

In Japan—Apples, the issue was whether the SPS prejudges the methodology that
should be used in the context of risk assessment. The AB found that the agreement does
not impose a particular methodology to this effect (§ 204).44 In the same report, the AB,
confirming prior case‐law [EC—Hormones (US)], held that the obligation to base
measures on risk assessment entails that, the WTO Member wishing to enact an SPS
measure, cannot carry out a risk assessment in a manner that precludes phyto‐sanitary
measures, other than the one already in place, to be considered. The AB found (§ 209)
that Japan violated its obligations under the SPS, conducting risk assessment justifying
the measure it had in place, without, however, inquiring into the possibility of other,
potentially applicable, measures. In this regard, the AB concluded that the SPS does
not request that a particular methodology be applied; it does, nonetheless, require that
the chosen methodology be specific to (in close connection with) the factual situation
investigated. The AB explained in its report on EC—Hormones (US) that a WTO
Member can base its measures on risk assessment performed either by another WTO
Member, or by an international organization (§ 190). In the same report, the AB
reversed a finding by the panel to the effect that Arts. 2.2 and 5.1 SPS impose a
minimum procedural requirement, in the sense that a WTO Member adopting an SPS
measure must provide evidence that it did base its measure on scientific evidence. In
the case at hand, the panel found no evidence in the body of the EC regulation
(reflecting the SPS measure), or in its preamble, that the EC had indeed based its
However, depending on the interpretation of Art 5.1 SPS, one could legitimately hold the view that
the SPS Agreement does impose a certain methodology, that is, the methodology privileged by the
relevant international organizations. The AB seems to suggest that risk assessment techniques and
methodology used are two distinct issues. There is not much support for this view, however, in scientific
discourse.
44
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measure on science and, consequently, held that it had violated its obligations under
the SPS. The AB disagreed (§§ 188–90). 45 In its view, no such obligation can be
discerned from the SPS.

As things stand, WTO Members must, pursuant to § 1 of Annex B to the SPS, ensure:

… that all sanitary and phytosanitary regulations which have been adopted are
published promptly in such a manner as to enable interested Members to become
acquainted with them.

§ 3 of the same Annex further requires from WTO Members to introduce enquiry points
whereby interested parties can request (and obtain) responses to reasonable queries
that they might have. These provisions guarantee the transparency of SPS measures
and, thus, there is no need, in the AB’s view, to also require that SPS measures reflect
that they have been based on scientific evidence.

Through risk assessment, WTO members aim at determining the probability that a
certain risk materializes. Assuming existence of risk, 46 it is for WTO Members,
depending on their risk aversion, to decide whether to intervene or not. Throughout
the GATT years, and until Japan—Apples, it was thought that a WTO adjudicating
It is true that a textual reading of the provisions does not impose such a requirement, however, from
an evidentiary perspective it is almost impossible for uninformed parties to discern the basis of an SPS
measure unless some evidence is provided. In fact, pursuant to § 1 of Annex B, WTO members must
ensure, ‘… that all sanitary and phytosanitary regulations which have been adopted are published
promptly in such a manner as to enable interested members to become acquainted with them’. Annex
B, § 3 further requires members to introduce enquiry points whereby interested parties can request (and
obtain) responses to reasonable queries that they might have. All the panel did was to read in context
(since transparency is provided for in the SPS Agreement) the articles concerning evidence that there is
scientific basis for the risk assessment performed. Following the AB’s ruling the door to ex post facto
rationalizations is not shut.
45

There is of course, always a certain degree of uncertainty surrounding such experiments, due, inter
alia, to the ever evolving nature of science.
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body could not prejudge the level of risk aversion that a given society unilaterally
sets. If at all, what was justiciable was not the ends sought, but the means serving ends.
In the WTO‐era, the AB reaffirmed this point in the most unambiguous terms in EC—
Hormones (US) (§ 186):

To the extent that the Panel purported to require a risk assessment to establish a
minimum magnitude of risk, we must note that imposition of such a quantitative
requirement finds no basis in the SPS Agreement. A panel is authorized only to
determine whether a given SPS measure is ‘based on’ risk assessment.

Note that, to reach this opinion, the AB dissociated the notion of risk assessment from
that of risk management. The latter term is used in many jurisdictions to denote the
level of risk that a given society is prepared to live with. That is, risk management
naturally follows risk assessment: assuming knowledge as to the distribution or
probabilities that an event might occur, any given society, depending on its risk
aversion, will define the level of protection as it deems appropriate.47 Following this
logic, the panel in EC ‐ Hormones (US) accepted the distinction between risk assessment
and risk management, holding that it can pronounce on the former but not on the latter.
The AB however, on formal grounds (lack of such a distinction in the SPS), dismissed
its relevance altogether (§ 181). A few paragraphs further down in the same report, the
AB asserted, as we saw supra, that there is no minimum magnitude of risk below
which no regulatory intervention is possible (§ 186), effectively thus accepting the
notion of risk management.

47

See the very comprehensive analysis on risk aversion in Sunstein (2002).
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Then came Japan—Apples.48 Japan imposed a series of measures to ban trade of apples
originating in the US, fearing that some of them might suffer from fire blight. Fire blight
affects apples, and not human life. There was no evidence that apples infected with
fire blight had been exported to Japan, although there was evidence of a shipment of
infected apples to the separate customs territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and
Matsu.49 However, the apples shipped to Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu were
not infected with fire blight, but rather from another disease (codling moth). Japan
claimed that it possessed sufficient scientific evidence that risk existed. The record
shows that apples infected with fire blight had been exported to New Zealand in the
early twentieth century, to the United Kingdom in the 1950s, and to Egypt a little later.
Scientific evidence showed (with a considerable degree of confidence) that the disease
had been transmitted because of the nature of the trade involved (trade in root stocks,
that is, in apple trees and not in apples). The trade involved in Japan—Apples dispute
concerned apples and not apple trees.

The expertise provided to the panel suggested that the risk of completing the pathway
(and thus, transmitting the disease) was negligible. Note that to reach this conclusion
the panel rejected the argument of the US that it was required to confine its review
only to mature symptom‐less apples, since only such apples were being exported to
Japan; the panel held that the risk (by human error) that immature symptom‐full
apples be exported to Japan should also be taken into account. In the experts’ view,
however, even if this were the case the risk was still negligible, because the disease
could only be transmitted through birds flying from infected apples to uninfected
apple trees. The panel, relying on the guidance of the experts on this point, explicitly

48

Neven and Weiler (2007) have provided an excellent, critical account of this dispute.

49

See § 160 of the AB report and footnote 289.
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accepted that there was negligible risk. It still went ahead, nevertheless, and found that
there was no rational or objective relationship between the measure and the relevant
scientific evidence. In light of the negligible risk identified on the basis of the scientific
evidence and the nature of elements composing the measure, the panel concluded that
the Japanese measure was clearly disproportionate to the risk (§ 8.198 and 8.199 of the
panel report).

The challenged measure, that was found to be disproportionate, consisted in nine
prohibitions or requirements (§§ 8.5ff. of the panel report). Among these measures
was the prohibition of importing apples from US states other than Oregon and
Washington, certification‐requirements, and the prohibition of exports, if fire blight
had been detected in a neighbouring geographical area. According to the Japanese
regulator, in the absence of a total embargo on imports, the risk that the disease would
spread was very much alive. Note that the panel did not reach its finding in this
respect based on Art. 5.6 SPS (which reflects the necessity‐requirement). It decided to
exercise judicial economy in this respect. It held that the measure was inconsistent
with Art. 2.2 SPS, since there was no scientific evidence to support it, although it
accepted that risk albeit negligible did exist.

The AB confirmed once again that a risk assessment must be in rational or objective
relationship with the SPS measure it led to, and that no such relationship exists in the
absence of scientific evidence (§ 164). It then endorsed the idea that in light of the
negligible risk, the challenged measure was disproportionate (§§ 160 and 163ff): the AB
held that the challenged measure was disproportionate as it was maintained without
any scientific evidence supporting it. It bears repetition that the AB reached the
conclusion that Japan was in violation of Art. 2.2 SPS.
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We note here (and will come back to this point infra) that Japan also invoked the
precautionary principle, and claimed that its measure was anyway consistent with Art.
5.7 SPS. The AB, nonetheless, held that a WTO Member cannot have recourse to
precautionary measures in case scientific expertise, to the effect that a negligible risk
exists, is available (§ 188).

Consistency: Art. 5.5 SPS requires consistency in the appropriate level of protection across
situations.50 WTO case‐law [AB report on EC – Hormones (US), in §§ 212 and 238] has
established that this provision should be read together with Art. 2.3 SPS, which, as we
saw supra, requires non‐discriminatory behaviour across WTO Members. In Australia –
Salmon, the AB went one step further and explained that a violation of Art. 5.5 SPS ipso
facto entails a violation of Art. 2.3, which reflects the non discrimination requirement
(§ 252):

…a finding of violation of Article 5.5 will necessarily imply a violation of Article 2.3,
first sentence, or Article 2.3, second sentence. Discrimination ʺbetween Members,
including their own territory and that of others Membersʺ within the meaning of
Article 2.3, first sentence, can be established by following the complex and indirect
route worked out and elaborated by Article 5.5. However, it is clear that this route is
not the only route leading to a finding that an SPS measure constitutes arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination according to Article 2.3, first sentence. Arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination in the sense of Article 2.3, first sentence, can be found to
exist without any examination under Article 5.5.

Hence, the two obligations, when read together, require consistency across situations
across WTO Members.51 Whereas the latter part (across WTO Members) seems easier to

For an economic analysis of Art. 5.5 SPS, see Pienaar (2005).
Note, however, that WTO Members do not need to, by virtue of Art. 6 SPS, apply their SPS measures
against all exports when a pest or a disease has surfaced which necessitated the adoption of the SPS
50
51
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grasp, the former part (across situations) is far from being a walk in the park for the
adjudicator. A benchmark is required in order to establish comparability across
situations. Case‐law has contributed some clarifications on this score.

The AB held, in EC – Hormones (US), that, for a violation of Art. 5.5 SPS to be
established, a complaining party must satisfy a three prong‐test (§§ 214 – 215):

Close inspection of Article 5.5 indicates that a complaint of violation of this Article must
show the presence of three distinct elements. The first element is that the Member
imposing the measure complained of has adopted its own appropriate levels of sanitary
protection against risks to human life or health in several different situations. The
second element to be shown is that those levels of protection exhibit arbitrary or
unjustifiable differences (ʺdistinctionsʺ in the language of Article 5.5) in their treatment
of different situations. The last element requires that the arbitrary or unjustifiable
differences result in discrimination or a disguised restriction of international trade. We
understand the last element to be referring to the measure embodying or implementing a
particular level of protection as resulting, in its application, in discrimination or a
disguised restriction on international trade.
We consider the above three elements of Article 5.5 to be cumulative in nature; all of
them must be demonstrated to be present if violation of Article 5.5 is to be found. In
particular, both the second and third elements must be found. The second element
alone would not suffice. The third element must also be demonstrably present: the
implementing measure must be shown to be applied in such a manner as to result in
discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade. The presence of the
second element – the arbitrary or unjustifiable character of differences in levels of
protection considered by a Member as appropriate in differing situations – may in
practical effect operate as a ʺwarningʺ signal that the implementing measure in its
application might be a discriminatory measure or might be a restriction on international
trade disguised as an SPS measure for the protection of human life or health.
Nevertheless, the measure itself needs to be examined and appraised and, in the context
of the differing levels of protection, shown to result in discrimination or a disguised
restriction on international trade. (emphasis in the original).

measure. Pest‐ and disease‐free areas can legitimately be excluded. The terms pest‐ or disease‐free area
and area of low pest or disease are further detailed in §§ 6 and 7 of Annex A to the SPS Agreement.
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To perform this test, the complaining party needs to first establish comparability across
situations. We quote from § 217 of the AB report on EC – Hormones (US):

… The situations exhibiting differing levels of protection cannot, of course, be compared
unless they are comparable, that is, unless they present some common element or
elements sufficient to render them comparable. If the situations proposed to be
examined are totally different from one another, they would not be rationally
comparable and the differences in levels of protection cannot be examined for
arbitrariness. (emphasis in the original).52

Then, AB explained, in the same report, that the letter and the spirit of Art. 5.5 SPS do
not require from WTO Members to guarantee absolute uniformity across the various
appropriate levels of protection that they pursue: Art. 5.5 SPS should be properly
understood as a legal prohibition of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination (§ 213):

The objective of Article 5.5 is formulated as the ʺachieving [of] consistency in the
application of the concept of appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protectionʺ.
Clearly, the desired consistency is defined as a goal to be achieved in the future. …Thus,
we agree with the Panelʹs view that the statement of that goal does not establish a legal
obligation of consistency of appropriate levels of protection. We think, too, that the goal
set is not absolute or perfect consistency, since governments establish their appropriate
levels of protection frequently on an ad hoc basis and over time, as different risks present
themselves at different times. It is only arbitrary or unjustifiable inconsistencies that are
to be avoided. (italics and emphasis in the original).

Subsequently, in Australia – Salmon, the AB offered a benchmark for comparability (§§
146 and 152):

… the Panel was correct in stating that situations can be compared under Article 5.5 if
these situations involve either a risk of entry, establishment or spread of the same or a
similar disease, or a risk of the same or similar ʺassociated potential biological and
economic consequencesʺ.
Applying this test, the AB held, in this case, that the European Community had violated Art. 5.5 SPS
by banning sales of hormone‐treated beef, and not banning sales of hormone‐treated pork.
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…
… we believe that for situations to be comparable under Article 5.5, it is sufficient for
these situations to have in common a risk of entry, establishment or spread of one
disease of concern. There is no need for these situations to have in common a risk of
entry, establishment or spread of all diseases of concern. (emphasis in the original).

Therefore, similarity of the disease or of the associated risk provides comparability.
Following this line of reasoning, the AB introduced in Australia – Salmon the term
warning signals, which refers to elements or properties of particular SPS measures that
could be relevant in establishing a violation of Art. 5.5 SPS. The quantity and quality of
such warning signals will ultimately prove to be the decisive factor in determining
whether Art. 5.5 SPS has been violated: substantial difference in the level of protection
(§ 164), and/or violation of Art. 5.1 SPS (§ 166), could serve as warning signals:

… in this case the degree of difference in the levels of protection (prohibition versus
tolerance) is indeed, as the Panel stated, ʺrather substantialʺ. We, therefore, consider it
legitimate to treat this difference as a separate warning signal.
…
… We note that a finding that an SPS measure is not based on an assessment of the
risks to human, animal or plant life or health – either because there was no risk
assessment at all or because there is an insufficient risk assessment – is a strong
indication that this measure is not really concerned with the protection of human,
animal or plant life or health but is instead a trade‐restrictive measure taken in the
guise of an SPS measure, i.e., a ʺdisguised restriction on international tradeʺ. We,
therefore, consider that the finding of inconsistency with Article 5.1 is an appropriate
warning signal for a ʺdisguised restriction on international tradeʺ.

Evidence of this attitude can also be traced in § 240 of the AB’s report on EC –
Hormones (US):

In our view, the degree of difference, or the extent of the discrepancy, in the levels of
protection, is only one kind of factor which, along with others, may cumulatively lead to
the conclusion that discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade in fact
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results from the application of a measure or measures embodying one or more of those
different levels of protection. … It is well to bear in mind that, after all, the difference in
levels of protection that is characterizable as arbitrary or unjustifiable is only an element
of (indirect) proof that a Member may actually be applying an SPS measure in a manner
that discriminates between Members or constitutes a disguised restriction on
international trade, prohibited by the basic obligations set out in Article 2.3 of the SPS
Agreement. (italics in the original).

The WTO Members adopted on 22 June 2000 53 Guidelines, which provide some
clarification on the scope of the obligation assumed under Art 5.5 of the SPS: WTO
Members must, in order to observe their consistency‐obligation, indicate the level of
protection which they consider appropriate, and also indicate if there is a difference in
the level of protection under consideration and levels already determined by the
regulating WTO Member in different situations; WTO Members must further compare
the level of protection now being sought with that already considered in previous
situations which contain sufficient common elements so as to render the two situations
comparable. 54 It follows that the Guidelines attach substantial importance on the
comparability across transactions.

Measures imposed on precaution: WTO Members can, in accordance with Art. 5.7 SPS,
adopt provisionally, even in the absence of scientific backing, SPS measures on the
basis of available information. In this case, however, they are under an obligation to
collect information that will enable them to perform a risk assessment within a
reasonable period of time. Although Art. 5.7 SPS does not explicitly refer to the
precautionary principle, WTO adjudicating bodies have held that this provision reflects

53

See WTO Doc G/SPS/15 of 18 July 2000.

See p 3 of the Guidelines, op cit, under A4. The italicized terms appear as such in the body of the
Guidelines.
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indeed the precautionary principle. In EC—Hormones (US), the AB summarized the
relevance of the precautionary principle in the WTO, in the following terms (§§ 123–5):

(a) the precautionary principle is reflected in Art. 5.7 SPS, but is also reflected in
other SPS provisions such as the preamble and Art. 3.3 SPS. Hence, the
precautionary principle is not exhaustively reflected in Art. 5.7 SPS;
(b) the status of precautionary principle under customary international law is
unclear;55
(c) WTO panels should keep precautionary principle in mind when interpreting the
SPS; but
(d) the precautionary principle does not override the explicit wording of specific SPS
provisions.

The relationship between Art. 5.7 SPS (precautionary principle), and Art. 2.2 SPS (the
obligation to base measures on scientific evidence), was addressed by the AB in its
report on Japan—Agricultural Products II56 in the following terms (§ 80):

… Article 5.7 allows Members to adopt provisional SPS measures “[I]n cases where
relevant scientific evidence is insufficient” and certain other requirements are fulfilled.
Article 5.7 operates as a qualified exemption from the obligation under Article 2.2 not to
maintain SPS measures without sufficient scientific evidence. An overly broad and
flexible interpretation of that obligation would render Article 5.7 meaningless.
(emphasis in the original).

55 In EC—Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, the panel, when dealing with the EC régime for
approval of GMOs even cited the International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) as support for
this finding that the precautionary principle had an uncertain status under customary international law
(§ 7.89).
56

See Dunoff (2005) for an informative account of this dispute.
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The AB, hence, held that Art. 5.7 SPS is an exception from the obligation to use
scientific evidence when enacting SPS measures. In Japan—Apples, the AB went one
step further: in its view, if science is well settled on an issue, recourse to precaution is
unwarranted. In a sense, the AB sees a firewall between scientific evidence and
precaution (§ 184):

The application of Article 5.7 is triggered not by the existence of scientific uncertainty,
but rather by the insufficiency of scientific evidence. The text of Article 5.7 is clear: it
refers to ‘cases where relevant scientific evidence is insufficient’, not to ‘scientific
uncertainty’. The two concepts are not interchangeable. Therefore, we are unable to
endorse Japan’s approach of interpreting Article 5.7 through the prism of ‘scientific
uncertainty’.

It follows, that, in the eyes of the AB, a measure can either be based on science or on
Art. 5.7 SPS, and that recourse to the latter is appropriate in cases of scientific
insufficiency, but not of scientific uncertainty.57 Case‐law did not explain the differences
between scientific insufficiency and scientific uncertainty any further. In US – Suspended
Concession, however, the AB seems to take distance from this approach summarily
accepting that recourse to precaution is possible when a WTO Member doubts the
validity of scientific expertise.

WTO case‐law has also dealt with the mechanics of the compliance with Art. 5.7 SPS.
The AB, in its report on Japan—Agricultural Products II established a four‐prong test that
must be met for a measure to be deemed consistent with Art. 5.7 SPS. In this case,
Japan invoked the precautionary principle in order to justify a measure which aimed
57 Note however, that the panel, in its report on Canada – Suspended Concession, casts doubt to the
integrity of this approach. In §§ 7.597 of its report, the panel takes the view that there is nothing wrong
with basing on precaution a measure which had previously been based on scientific evidence, if new
information has reduced the legitimacy of the previous scientific paradigm.
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at the protection of a series of commodities. As enunciated by the AB, all four
elements of the test must be cumulatively met (§ 89):

Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement sets out four requirements which must be met in order
to adopt and maintain a provisional SPS measure. Pursuant to the first sentence of
Article 5.7, a Member may provisionally adopt an SPS measure if this measure is:
(1) imposed in respect of a situation where “relevant scientific information is
insufficient”; and
(2) adopted “on the basis of available pertinent information”.
Pursuant to the second sentence of Article 5.7, such a provisional measure may not be
maintained unless the Member which adopted the measure:
(1) “seek[s] to obtain the additional information necessary for a more objective
assessment of risk”; and
(2) “review[s] the … measure accordingly within a reasonable period of time.

These four requirements are clearly cumulative in nature and are equally important
for the purpose of determining consistency with this provision. Whenever one of these
four requirements is not met, the measure at issue is inconsistent with Article 5.7.
(emphasis in the original).

Case‐law has contributed some additional clarifications. The term reasonable period of
time, for example, was discussed in the AB report on Japan—Agricultural Products II.
There, the AB held that this term will have to be interpreted on a case by case basis. In
this particular case, 4 years of inaction by Japan subsequent to the adoption of a
measure under Art. 5.7 SPS was deemed to be unreasonable (§ 93). In the same
dispute, the AB held that the additional information sought during the reasonable
period of time must be germane in conducting risk assessment (§ 92):

…we note that the first part of the second sentence stipulates that the Member
adopting a provisional SPS measure ʺshall seek to obtain the additional information
necessary for a more objective assessment of riskʺ. Neither Article 5.7 nor any other
provision of the SPS Agreement sets out explicit prerequisites regarding the additional
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information to be collected or a specific collection procedure. Furthermore, Article 5.7
does not specify what actual results must be achieved; the obligation is to ʺseek to
obtainʺ additional information. However, Article 5.7 states that the additional
information is to be sought in order to allow the Member to conduct ʺa more objective
assessment of riskʺ. Therefore, the information sought must be germane to conducting
such a risk assessment, i.e., the evaluation of the likelihood of entry, establishment or
spread of, in casu, a pest, according to the SPS measures which might be applied.
(italics in the original).

Case‐law has so far not addressed the question whether precautionary measures must
still observe the non‐discrimination obligation (Art. 3.2 SPS), the consistency‐
requirement (Art. 5.5 SPS), and the necessity‐requirement (Art. 5.6 SPS). There are
some indications, nonetheless, to the effect that an affirmative response is required.

The text of Art. 5.7 SPS does not absolve WTO Members from the obligation to
observe the three obligations. There are thus, textual arguments in favour of the
affirmative response. The travaux préparatoires unfortunately, do not shed enough light
on this issue. Some of the negotiating history of this provision58 suggests that it was
drafted to deal with emergency situations, such as an outbreak of a disease. This is by
now water under the bridge: the AB in its report on EC—Hormones (US) extended Art.
5.7 SPS to cover precautionary measures which do not necessarily have to be taken
under urgency. Subsequently, the EC circulated a proposal inviting the WTO
Membership to think further about the content of the precautionary principle:59 in its
view, measures based on precaution must be proportional to the chosen level of
protection, non‐discriminatory in their application, and also consistent with past
practice (assuming, of course, that comparability across transactions has been

See, inter alia, GATT Docs MTN.GNG/NG5/WGSP/7
MTN.GNG/NG5/WGSP/17 of 30 April 1990.

58

59

See WTO Doc G/SPS/GEN/168 of 14 March 2000.
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of

20

November

1990,

and

established).60 To appreciate the EC proposal, it is probably warranted to see how the
EC institutions understand precaution: one of the leading cases in EC‐law in this field
is Commission v. Netherlands,61 where the court outlawed a Dutch measure banning
marketing of foodstuffs to which nutrients had been added. The Court made it first
clear that the proportionality‐requirement (adopt the least restrictive for trade measure)
should be observed in cases where the precautionary principle has been invoked as well
(§ 46). It provided its understanding that the precautionary principle should not be
dissociated completely from scientific evidence. The court understands precaution as
one point in a line (continuum) that might lead to scientific proof:

A proper application of the precautionary principle requires, in the first place, the
identification of the potentially negative consequences for health of the proposed
addition of nutrients, and, secondly, a comprehensive assessment of the risk for health
based on the most reliable scientific data available and the most recent results of
international research. (Commission v Denmark, § 51).
Where it proves to be impossible to determine with certainty the existence or extent of
the alleged risk because of the insufficiency, inconclusiveness or imprecision of the
results of studies conducted, but the likelihood of real harm to public health persists
should the risk materialise, the precautionary principle justifies the adoption of
restrictive measures. (Commission v Denmark, §§ 52 and 53).

It should come thus as no surprise that proportionality must be respected even when
recourse to precaution has been made. It follows that some state practice, as well,
supports the view that the SPS measures based on precaution should respect Arts. 2.3,
5.5, 5.6 SPS as well.

See also the European Council Resolution on the Precautionary Principle, WTO Doc G/SPS/GEN/225
of 2 February 2001.

60

C‐41/02 Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of the Netherlands [2004] ECR I‐
11375.

61
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4.3.4 International Standards
Peru was requested by the AB to prove that the EC could have attended its objective
by sticking to the IS on the denomination of sardines, since this IS was an appropriate
and effective means in this endeavour (AB report, at § 287). More specifically, the AB
requested that (AB report, at § 290).

We note that the Panel concluded that ʺPeru has adduced sufficient evidence and legal
arguments to demonstrate that Codex Stan 94 is not ineffective or inappropriate to
fulfil the legitimate objectives pursued by the EC Regulation.ʺ We have examined the
analysis which led the Panel to this conclusion. We note, in particular, that the Panel
made the factual finding that ʺit has not been established that consumers in most
member States of the European Communities have always associated the common
name ʹsardinesʹ exclusively with Sardina pilchardusʺ. We also note that the Panel gave
consideration to the contentions of Peru that, under Codex Stan 94, fish from the
species Sardinops sagax bear a denomination that is distinct from that of Sardina
pilchardus , and that ʺthe very purpose of the labelling regulations set out in
Codex Stan 94 for sardines of species other than Sardina pilchardus is to ensure market
transparencyʺ. We agree with the analysis made by the Panel. Accordingly, we see no
reason to interfere with the Panelʹs finding that Peru has adduced sufficient evidence
and legal arguments to demonstrate that Codex Stan 94 meets the legal requirements
of effectiveness and appropriateness set out in Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement. (italics
in the original).

It follows that Peru was not requested to prove anything beyond what it had already
proved at the panel‐stage. Note however, that, as briefly discussed above, the panel
had opted for a different allocation of the burden of production. So the AB contented
itself to requesting from Peru what it had already proved at the panel stage. It did not
shift the burden of proof to the EC following Peru’s demonstration. Surprisingly, in
the absence of such a shift, and the different now allocation of the burden of
production notwithstanding, the AB still found in favour of Peru.

This solution was inspired by the solution in the SPS‐context, where the AB, first in its
report on EC – Hormones (US) held that it is up to the complainant to establish that the
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regulating Member could have attained its objectives by sticking to the international
standard at hand and that, consequently, no need for deviation was warranted (§§ 104
and 172):

… It appears to us that the Panel has misconceived the relationship between Articles
3.1, 3.2 and 3.3, a relationship discussed below, which is qualitatively different from
the relationship between, for instance, Articles I or II and Article XX of the GATT 1994.
… Article 3.3 recognizes the autonomous right of a Member to establish such higher
level of protection, provided that that Member complies with certain requirements in
promulgating SPS measures to achieve that level. … The general rule in a dispute
settlement proceeding requiring a complaining party to establish a prima facie case of
inconsistency with a provision of the SPS Agreement before the burden of showing
consistency with that provision is taken on by the defending party, is not avoided by
simply describing that same provision as an ʺexceptionʺ. In much the same way,
merely characterizing a treaty provision as an ʺexceptionʺ does not by itself justify a
ʺstricterʺ or ʺnarrowerʺ interpretation of that provision than would be warranted by
examination of the ordinary meaning of the actual treaty words, viewed in context and
in the light of the treatyʹs object and purpose, or, in other words, by applying the
normal rules of treaty interpretation.
...
Under Article 3.3 of the SPS Agreement, a Member may decide to set for itself a level of
protection different from that implicit in the international standard, and to implement
or embody that level of protection in a measure not ʺbased onʺ the international
standard. The Memberʹs appropriate level of protection may be higher than that
implied in the international standard. The right of a Member to determine its own
appropriate level of sanitary protection is an important right. This is made clear in the
sixth preambular paragraph of the SPS Agreement: …the right of a Member to establish
its own level of sanitary protection under Article 3.3 of the SPS Agreement is an
autonomous right and not an ʺexceptionʺ from a ʺgeneral obligationʺ under Article 3.1.
(italics and emphasis in the original).
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4.4 Concluding Remarks on TBT/SPS Case-Law
Case‐law in this area exhibits problems with respect to both the allocation of burden
of production as well as of persuasion. We limit the analysis to a few key disputes
which are an illustration of the overall attitude.

4.4.1 EC – Hormones
The dispute in a nutshell: the EC banned sales of hormone treated‐beef in its market.
The US protested that the ban was inconsistent with various SPS‐requirements: in its
view, since the EC had not based its ban on scientific risk assessment and had not
invoked the precautionary principle either, it was running afoul its obligations.

Evidence by the complainant: The complainant pointed to the existence of an IS; as
argued above, the AB decided that the complainant still carried the burden of
production, the existence of an IS notwithstanding. The complainant however, did not
carry a heavy burden of persuasion since all it had to show was that the EC did not
base its findings on scientific evidence; it did not add anything to the evidence it had
already submitted to the panel. The evidence submitted with respect to hormone
treated‐chicken is quite telling: the AB found in favour of the complainant because the
EC banned sales of hormone treated‐beef but not –chicken, without clear
demonstration that the two products are equally dangerous to human health.62

Counter‐evidence by the defendant: the EC did not produce any meaningful counter‐
evidence and, as alluded to supra, did not invoke the precautionary principle either.

62

See the critical remarks by Horn and Mavroidis (2003) on this score.
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The evaluation by the AB: The AB found in favour of the US because of the absence of
risk assessment to justify the sales ban; it also found that the EC had violated Art. 5.5
SPS by treating hormone treated‐beef and –chicken differently.

Our evaluation: It is difficult to argue with the AB regarding the absence of risk
assessment. For the reasons explained above, both its findings regarding the allocation
of burden of production in presence of an IS, as well as the burden of persuasion
regarding the consistency‐requirement are not sound.

4.4.2 EC – Sardines
This is the mirror to EC – Hormones. The findings are symmetric and so is the
allocation of the burden of production and persuasion.

4.4.3 Japan - Apples
The dispute in a nutshell: Japan bans imports of US apples because they have been hit
by fire blithe.

Evidence by the complainant: the US provided evidence pointing to the absence of fire
blithe in US exports.

Counter‐evidence by the defendant: Japan provided scientific evidence showing the
risk emanating from this disease, as well as evidence regarding shipments of apples to
other WTO Members that had been contaminated by fire blithe.
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The evaluation by the AB: the AB accepted the soundness of the scientific evidence
submitted by Japan, but still found against it because the regulatory intervention was
illegitimate in its view in light of the negligibility of the risk involved.

Our evaluation: this is a very odd outcome. The AB case‐law is inconsistent across
cases: in EC – Hormones it accepted that WTO Members can legitimately pursue zero
risk policies, whereas here it finds that in light of the negligibility of the risk involved
no regulatory intervention was warranted. Crucially, the AB cannot itself decide on
the level of risk aversion that WTO Members must exhibit: such attitude goes directly
against its own pronouncements that in the context of similar disputes it will question
the means employed but not the ends sought.

5 Conclusions
In this paper we focused on the allocation of burden of proof in environmental
disputes. Our analysis suggests that WTO adjudicating bodies have consistently
assigned the burden of production of proof to the complainant: this attitude has not
changed not even in presence of IS where one might intuitively have thought that the
allocation of burden of production would be different. As to the burden of persuasion,
our analysis suggests that de facto, the complaining party does not need to show
evidence of (adverse) trade effects or protectionist intent; de jure, the complaining
party might need to show evidence of protectionist intent in cases where a fiscal
instrument has been chosen and the tax differential between two DCS products is
more than de minimis but less than substantial. Such has never been the case so far.

This allocation of burden of proof is not unproblematic. Our analysis above also
shows that:
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(a) WTO adjudicating bodies have committed errors regarding the allocation of
burden of persuasion in GATT cases;
(b) They have committed errors regarding the allocation of both the burden of
persuasion as well as the burden of production in TBT/SPS cases.

The absence of explanation regarding the (mis‐)allocation of the burden of production
makes it difficult to understand the reasons behind the commission of such errors: as
things stand it is difficult to say whether the allocation of burden of production in EC
– Sardines is due to the disapproval by the AB of the legislative laissez faire attitude
towards IS, or whether, as Horn and Weiler (2007) have suggested, it is the
strengthening of IS that dictated the approach. For reasons having to do with the
(continued) incentive to negotiate IS it would make sense to keep their legitimacy
intact in the WTO legal order and allocate the burden of production when in presence
of IS accordingly. The same result obtains if private information becomes the key
criterion for allocating the burden of production.

Nevertheless, there are good reasons to believe that the following factors help explain
the errors regarding the allocation of burden of persuasion: a court will allocate the
burden of persuasion in light, inter alia, of the objectives that a legal canon pursues; it
is the response to the question ‘what does this legal discipline aim to achieve?’ that
will inform (along with other factors) the allocation of the burden of persuasion. WTO
adjudicating bodies must, in other words, have a theory about what features the
resolution of the case should have. This is precisely what seems to be missing in the
majority of the cases. The problem seems to be that in the eyes of adjudicating bodies,
the VCLT is all methodology that is needed. This is obviously wrong. The VCLT can
help the judge as to the selection of interpretative elements that it can use; it cannot
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help the judge to determine for instance whether selling an asset through an auction
exhausts a previously conferred subsidy, to take just an example from case law (in this
case from US – Certain EC Products). To do this, the judge will need to develop its own
understanding of how the outcomes of disputes help members achieve desired
purposes. Since the purposes of the agreement largely are economic, recourse to
economics is necessary. Absent such expertise it is no surprise that determinations
often appear dubious from an economic perspective. 63

Another possibility for an adjudicating body to get information about the rationale for
a particular provision is to visit the negotiating record. This is hardly ever done. On
the contrary, WTO adjudicating bodies routinely repeat that there is no legal
compulsion to take into consideration the negotiating record, invoking Art. 32 VCLT
to this effect. This may formally be the case, but we believe that the negotiating record
can often be informative, and that it should not be completely disregarded in the
name of Art. 32 VCLT, since it was not meant to annihilate altogether the value of the
negotiating record. 64

63 Compare the conclusions of various authors that have been contributing papers in the volumes
edited by Horn and Mavroidis for the American Law Institute since 2001.
64 See for example, the discussions regarding NT as reported in Irwin et al. (2008).
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